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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
One cannot expect to know what is going to happen. 
One can only consider himself fortunate if he can 
discover what has happened. 
-Pierre de Pont 
Most organizations are in a time of rapid change, both in the public and in 
the private sectors, and public community colleges are no exception. Private sector 
organizations can now survive and thrive only by quick adaptation to market 
realities. That adaptation occurs in many ways, some of which are innovative and 
transformational in nature, such as the use of new technologies and new 
manufacturing methods. Adaptation can also occur through new management 
strategies, such as reengineering or reversing market direction. Public community 
colleges are no less sensitive to environmental realities because of funding and 
political considerations and must also develop ways to adapt and transform from 
traditional higher education institutions with high degrees of consistency and 
stability to ones of flexibility and responsiveness. 
A community college is a distinctly American 2-year publicly funded 
institution which stands between secondary education and universities, between 2 
developmental education and higher education, and between job exploration and a 
trained technical position in local industry. It has a comprehensive curriculum 
aimed at a comprehensive mission. Its most marked characteristic is its "open door" 
policy; access to community colleges is not limited by scores of admissions 
examinations or high school grades. Community colleges serve their local 
communities with curriculum geared to local and regional needs and are intended to 
be financially feasible. 
Community colleges which have been founded in the past few years may 
easily shift from one paradigm to another like their fast-moving private sector 
counterparts. But what about the community colleges that were birthed during 
another era, those that have a history and traditions that are steeped with 
significance related to their junior college roots? Those colleges, despite their 
comprehensive missions and diverse student bodies, have self-images that reflect 
themselves as primarily university models of preparation for transfer to a 4-year 
college, in which well-prepared students engage in challenging work with elite 
academicians (Baker, 1992; Bryant, 1988). How do those colleges manage 
transformation to also survive and thrive? 
Preparing for and dealing with the impact of change is a fundamental 
leadership task for the community college leaders of today. Dale Parnell (1990) 
stated: 
The decade of the 1990s will present colleges and universities with rich new 
possibilities and opportunities as well as some challenges. Higher education 
leaders who can recognize and take advantage of external windows of 3 
opportunity and solve some of the internal operating problems will be the 
leaders for Dateline 2000. (p. 32) 
Complex issues of diversity, quality, accountability, competition, and new 
technologies require community college leaders to address the challenges of external 
adaptation and internal integration by paying attention to not only mission and 
direction, but also to the change process itself. The interrelationships between 
leadership and organizational transformation are fundamental to understanding the 
complexities and dynamics of organizational change at a community college. 
The purpose of this study was to explore the organizational impact of 
significant changes in leadership at a specific community college during the initial 
period of that change. It was the primary purpose of this research project to broaden 
the research on organizational change by describing and analyzing the forces both 
externally and internally that impacted the first change efforts of a new senior 
leadership team at a public community college, and to describe the impact of the 
new team on the organizational change that was occurring around them (Bess, 1984; 
Cooper & Kempner, 1993; Kotter, 1995). 
Using qualitative methodology and a case study format, the study examined 
from the "inside-out" a community college in the northwest United States that had 
been stable for almost 30 years before undergoing a massive change in senior 
leadership in a short time period. How were this new team's decisions impacted by 
the history and environment of the institution? And in turn, how did the new team 
affect the organizational change within the institution? 4 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions that guided this study are grounded in the literature 
of organizational change and transformation and are listed as follows: 
1.  What did the research literature reveal about the impacts of change, 
especially when new leadership is installed in an organization? 
2.  What were the external and internal forces that influenced significant 
organizational change in this institution? 
3.  What was the impact on the organization of a shift from 
organizational stability to one of change? 
4.  To what extent did the new senior leadership team influence or 
manage organizational change? 
5.  How was organizational change implemented by a new senior 
leadership team in one community college? 
6.  What can be learned from this case study about the impact on a large 
and stable community college resulting from a significant change in executive 
leadership? 
The college in this case study is an organization in a highly unusual state of 
flux and transition in which many forms of change were occurring at one time. The 
complexities of this transition provided particularly valuable insights into 
organizational change from a community college perspective. 5 
BACKGROUND  
Seaview Community College is an established community college nestled in 
an elite suburb right outside of a large metropolitan city. Seaview has been a very 
stable institution. The immediate past president began his teaching career there over 
30 years ago, and apprenticed under his mentor, who was the president before him. 
These two people, with similar values and temperaments, led the college and hired 
most of the staff through several decades. Over half of the faculty had been at 
Seaview for their entire careers and have received their 25-year pins. The policy 
and procedures manual has not been significantly updated in 20 years. Buildings 
were old; the trees and shrubs around the campus are mature and beautiful. 
The college has prided itself for many years on its academic reputation, and 
faculty have been very proud of the excellence of Seaview's many students who 
transferred successfully to a 4-year college or university. Seaview was highly 
funded by the state for many years, and though no radical internal change was 
possible because of not having any extra money, expectations to continue the status 
quo were regularly fulfilled because there was usually enough money. There were 
few hires, and no terminations of any kind. The leadership was paternal and 
autocratic, and tensions between the faculty union and the administration were 
normal. While incremental improvements occurred over time, there were few major 
innovations, new program development, or growth. There were also few crises. 
Things stayed in one place for a very long time. 6 
Two years ago, the winds of change began to blow at Seaview, and soon 
picked up momentum and force. Enrollment had dipped precariously. The college 
was in danger of not meeting its minimum enrollment target, which had dire future 
financial consequences. The neighboring community colleges began to get much 
attention for their growing enrollments and aggressive market stances. The long-
time president retired amidst much fanfare, and a new president was hired by the 
campus with an outcry of "it is time for a change." The new president, who came 
from a very successful, growing, fast-moving neighboring college, was given clear 
expectations by the Board and his campus constituents that Seaview needed to "get 
off its duff," move into the twentieth century, and "go be competitive." 
This meant, to the new president, moving the college from the narrow junior 
college mission to a broader comprehensive mission involving not only college 
transfer, but also substantial growth and innovation in technical education, 
developmental education, community service, and economic development. 
Because of several twists of fate, several key positions were vacated soon 
after the new president was hired, and he found himself in his first year in the 
unusual position of hiring four of five new vice-presidents, forming an entirely new 
senior leadership team. Additionally, he hired several replacement mid-management 
directors and deans. 
During the time of this case study, this new leadership team at Seaview had 
just begun working together. Enrollment had continued to spiral on a dangerous 
downward trend. 7 
The tornado had hit. The magnitude and force of the change winds were 
shaking the college's foundation. What lessons could be learned from a community 
college engaged in such dramatic transformation? 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY 
Organizational change is defined by Schein (1970) as the "induction of new 
patterns of action, belief, and attitudes among substantial segments of a population" 
(p. 4). Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1983) believes that change is defined by the 
crystallization of new action possibilities, which include new policies, new 
behaviors, new patterns, new methodologies, new products, or new market ideas, 
all based on reconceptualized patterns in the workplace. Changes may be brought 
about by internal changes, external pressures, or a combination of both. Decision-
makers, via their patterns of leadership, influence both positively and negatively an 
organization's internal and external environments, and because of that, are 
integrally related to the process and cycles of organizational change (Kilmann, 
Covin, Bennis, Mason, & Mitroff, 1988; Kiss ler, 1991). 
Noel Tichy (1983) argues that all organizations have three interrelated cycles 
of transformation, which are ongoing dilemmas and constantly evolving. The first is 
in technical design, in which the organization faces a production problem in which 
social and technical resources must be arranged so that the organization produces a 
specific desired output. The second is in political allocation, in which the 
organization deals with the problem of allocating power and resources. The third is 8 
the ideological problem, in which the organization must determine what values need 
to be held by what people. At different points of time, any one of them may be in 
need of adjustment, and each cycle has associated with it a different set of problem 
solving. Organizations vary over time in the amount of energy invested in making 
adjustments in each of these cycles, all of which contribute to organizational 
transformation. 
The studies of Masland (1985) and Tierney (1988) suggest that a better 
understanding of the interaction between diverse and changing internal and external 
environments is essential to effective functioning of organizations, especially those 
working through change processes. Schein (1980) asserts that the magnitude of 
organizational change is dependent on two factors: the degree to which the 
organization is ready to change as the result of internal or external forces, and 
whether the organization is in a developmental stage of growth, organizational mid-
life, or maturity. For the mature organization, the values of the organization 
preserve the glories of the past, providing a valued source of defense and self-
esteem, and frame-breaking is much more difficult. Schein (1980) indicates in all of 
those developmental stages, there are two options for change: transformation or 
decline. In transformation, change can be managed or can evolve; in destruction, 
change occurs at paradigm levels and through replacement of many key people. 
Dyer (1985, 1986) examined change mechanisms in several organizations 
and found that they follow several patterns: (a) the organization develops a sense of 
crisis and concludes it needs new leadership; (b) there is a weakening of pattern 9 
maintenance in the sense that procedures, beliefs, and systems that support the old 
ways break down; (c) a new leader and leadership team with new assumptions is 
brought in from the outside to deal with the crisis; (d) conflict develops between the 
proponents of the old assumptions and the new leadership; and (e) if the crisis is 
eased, new assumptions begin to be embedded and reinforced by a new set of 
pattern maintenance activities. 
Although new leaders might be empowered to initiate change, they are often 
not in a position to dictate commitment, especially in academic settings (Austin, 
1990; Baldridge & Deal, 1983). In an ideal organization, people understand the 
necessity for change and support it accordingly. In real organizations, change can 
appear chaotic because outcomes are not predictable (Beckhard & Harris, 1987; 
Dent, 1991). Individuals or groups who perceive themselves or their membership as 
autonomous are not likely to view coercive power or the power to legislate change 
and compliance as friendly (Kotter, 1988). 
Organizations are social structures reflecting the characteristics of people 
who make up their membership. Change can be perceived as exciting and 
unthreatening or intrusive and frightening. The organization's response to change is 
governed by individuals who shape or define its context. That context is worth 
exploring, since it can influence the ultimate institutionalization of organizational 
change (Feldman, 1988; Goodman, 1982). 
A growing body of empirical evidence points out that the top management 
team may be a more important determinant of an organization's ability to change 10 
and adapt than the chief executive officer alone (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990; Hambrick, 1981; Hurst, Rush, & White, 1989). These and other researchers 
have noted that it is the top management team through which critical information is 
filtered and by which strategic decisions are made (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; 
Norburn & Birley, 1988; O'Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989). 
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
A particularly important part of this research study was the element of 
participant-observation. As one of the new vice-presidents hired on the new senior 
leadership team, the researcher's voice in the decisions of that team became 
necessarily part of the context of the study. 
Participant observation is a legitimate way to collect data, particularly in 
case study methodology (Jorgenson, 1989). It allows a view of the research 
variables from a particularly unique perspective, from the inside-out. In this case 
study, unrestricted access to relevant documents, people, and situations would have 
been impossible without being a participant-observer. Another distinct advantage 
for this type of single case-study that is not usually referenced is the opportunity of 
the participant-observer to observe in many more situations than that of an outside 
researcher who must only view the organization on specific days, times, or in 
specific meetings or interactions. The ability of the participant-observer to be 
flexible and adaptive in working with key respondents to gain information and 
perspective is another benefit. It was much easier to be at the right place at the right 11 
time as a participant observer, and thus the picture gained through the research was 
much richer, less artificial, and more contextually holistic than it might have been if 
the research had been confined to more restrictive parameters. This was especially 
important because of the interwoven variables of organizational change; there is no 
distinct start or stop that cleanly divides more traditional quantitative research. 
Being a new administrator at the college also allowed the researcher a 
natural opportunity to ask open-ended questions about the campus, its history, the 
research subjects' roles at the college, their perspective about the changes, and their 
predictions for the future. 
A potential problem for research involving participant-observation is the risk 
of biased results (Becker, 1958). Being new to the campus, this risk was mitigated 
somewhat, since the researcher was observing with fresh eyes. A bigger risk was 
the possibility that respondents would be influenced by a hierarchical position in the 
institution and their responses might therefore be screened. The possibility of this 
occurring was considered in the design study, and alleviated by two decisions. 
First, respondents in the interviews were purposefully selected who had no 
reporting relationship to the researcher. Second, while the researcher did participate 
as a member of the senior leadership team, the specific events and decisions studied 
in the research were not within the researcher's specific area of responsibility at the 
institution. 
For the purposes of this study, field notes were kept as a critical component 
of the data collection and analysis process. Analysis occurred concurrently with the 12 
data collection, allowing a continuous refinement of focus. As a participant 
observer, the researcher was able to be included in many discussions and meetings 
that provided rich information. During these meetings, detailed field notes were 
developed including verbatim comments that were related to the impacts of change. 
Changes were noted in perspective, decision-making, verbal and nonverbal 
behaviors from all participants. It was important to engage in persistent observation, 
or keeping oneself open to multiple influences throughout the period of study, in 
order to obtain the most objective information. 
The practical significance of this study is that by analyzing the experience of 
one established community college undergoing substantive administrative change 
while also experiencing changed external variables, insights could be gained about 
the interrelationships between leadership transitions and organizational change. 
Chapter II of this case study reviews the existing research related to 
organizational change and changes in senior leadership. Chapter III describes the 
design of the study and the methodology employed. This case study used a 
combination of participant observation, in-depth interviews, and selected document 
review to gather empirical data. Chapter IV of the study reports the findings, and 
chapter five analyzes the fmdings in the case and presents overall patterns related to 
the research that may be reflective of the link between organizational change and 
senior leadership transition. 
The theoretical concept of organizational change is still in its infancy. The 
findings from this exploratory study provide direction for future research in higher 13 
education and contribute to the growing hypotheses about the connection between 
senior leadership transitions and organizational change. 14 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Schein (1970) defines organizational change as the "induction of new 
patterns of action, belief, and attitudes among substantial segments of a population" 
(p. 4). Tichy (1983) defines it as the nonroutine, nonincremental, and discontinuous 
change which alters the overall orientation of the organization. 
All definitions of organizational change are problematic. Most assume that 
we can differentiate between states of change and stability. In fact, organizations are 
always changing, often in subtle or incremental ways. 
Each conceptual or theoretical approach to organizational change highlights 
an important aspect or variable of change in an organization. Change affects and is 
affected by individual skills and attitudes. Change alters formal patterns of roles and 
relationships. Change attracts and stimulates issues of power and conflict. Change 
alters and is influenced by culture, and serves both operational and symbolic 
purposes. There is a dynamic interplay among all of the various elements of any 
organization in transition. 
MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
Intellectual themes interweave as they form frameworks for organizational 
change. Many models of organizational change are based on the original thinking of 
Kurt Lewin (1958). According to Lewin (1958), a pioneer in the field of social 15 
psychology of organizations, the first part of any change process is to unfreeze the 
present pattern of behavior. The second step, movement, is to take action that will 
change the social system from its original level of behavior or operation to a new 
model. The third refreezing step involves establishing a process that will make the 
new level of behavior relatively secure against change (Lewin, 1958). 
Edward Schein (1987) elaborated on Lewin's (1958) model by defining the 
first step, unfreezing, as that of creating motivation and readiness. Organizational 
members are not likely to embrace change unless they experience some need for it. 
Unfreezing involves employees experiencing dissatisfaction with the status quo, 
induction of guilt or anxiety about the future, and the creation of psychological 
safety. The second stage Schein (1987) labels as "cognitive restructuring," that is, 
helping people to see things differently and to react differently in the future. He 
identified two main processes for accomplishing this task: identification with a new 
role model, mentor, or boss in order to begin to see things from another point of 
view, and scanning the environment for new and relevant information. The final 
stage entails both taking the new, changed way of doing things and making it fit 
comfortably into a personal self-concept, as well as engaging with others about the 
new way of doing things to help them see why the change is better than the old 
way. 
Noel Tichy (1983) is a strong voice in organizational change research, 
primarily because of his contention that there have been three dominant yet fairly 
distinct traditions guiding the practice of organizational change. The technical view 16 
is rational, based on empiricism and the scientific method. The political view is 
based on the belief that organizations have dominant groups, and bargaining is the 
primary mode of change. The cultural view is the belief that shared symbols, 
values, and "cognitive schemes," as Tichy (1983) labels them, are what tie people 
together. Change occurs by altering norms and the cognitive schemes of 
organizational members. According to Tichy (1983), all three of these modes must 
be adjusted and realigned for successful organizational change. 
Burke and Litwin (1992) provide a model that includes cause (organizational 
conditions) and effect (resultant performance). In their view, the variables of 
conscious strategy, leadership, and culture have more weight than the variables of 
structure, management practices, and systems in predicting the success of 
organizational change. 
An important consideration in reviewing the literature of organizational 
change is that most models assume change strategies that are explicit, purposefully 
developed, and planned in advance. But in "real life," change has both intentional 
(explicitly planned for) and unintentional (emerged out of the situation) aspects. 
Kanter, Stein, and Jick (1992) posit that organizations are always in motion. 
Organizations do have some central thrust or direction reflecting a combination of 
past events, pushes arising from the environment, and pulls arising from the 
strategies embraced by the organization's dominant coalitions. However, the 
activity clusters, such as task units, divisions, projects, interest groups, and 17 
alliances, are also in motion, and their movements at any time may or may not be in 
step with each other or with the overall direction. 
Kanter et al. (1992) broaden their change model to include three kinds of 
motion, three forms of change, and three primary roles in the change process. Of 
the three kinds of movement, the first is described as the motion of the whole 
organization as it relates to movement in its environment; the second is the motion 
of the parts of the organization in relation to one another as the organization grows, 
ages, and progresses through its life cycle; and the third is the movement that 
focuses on the political dimensions. 
These three kinds of movement help to distinguish three basic forms of 
organizational change: identity, coordination, and control. Identity changes are 
caused through reformulation of an organization's relationship to its environment as 
environmental movement presents pressures and opportunities for change. 
Coordination changes relate to the problems of shape and structure of the internal 
array of parts in the organization that emerge as it grows and ages. Changes in 
control stress the political dimension, such as which set of interests predominates in 
the organization. 
These three kinds of organizational changes are tied to three basic roles 
inherent in the change process. The change strategy role often occurs at the 
beginning of a change sequence, and is usually the responsibility of top leaders. 
That role is one of concern with the connection between the organization and its 
environment and with the organization's overall direction. The change implementor 18 
role is often associated with mid-managers, who often have the responsibility for 
the development of the change effort and its internal coordination. The change 
recipient role includes those who are strongly affected by the change and its 
implementation, but who do not have much opportunity to influence those effects. 
The three kinds of organizational motion can lead in very different 
directions, and the three action roles may not just reflect different responsibilities, 
but also different perspectives and interests that can interfere in any one group's 
ability to realize its intention perfectly. The multiple possibility theory of Kanter et 
al. (1992) is not as simple or linear as other research models, and because it 
assumes much that is unpredictable, could therefore be seen as less useful. 
Operationally, however, understanding the multiple forces and variables involved in 
organizational change can help leaders be more effective in a world of complex 
motion and real multiple possibilities. "Ultimately, despite the limits upon what 
people can control, it is still up to people to act, and in acting, they do more than 
predict the future, they invent it" (Kanter et al., 1992, p. 18). 
Kanter et al.'s (1992) model also provides a framework to understand and 
apply other research related to organizational change. The rest of this chapter is 
organized into headings using Kanter et al.'s (1992) model as a frame: three kinds 
of organizational forces that set change events in motion, three forms of 
organizational change, and three roles in the change process. 19 
FORCES THAT SET CHANGE EVENTS IN MOTION  
Organizational Movement Related to Environment 
Beckhard and Pritchard (1992) define five forces that serve as the focus to 
fundamental change: change in the mission, change in the identity or outside image, 
change in relationships to key stakeholders, change in the way of work, and change 
in the culture. Although one focus of change may be the primary driver of the 
organizational change, the others will inevitably be affected as well. For instance, 
when leadership decides that the mission or purpose of the organization must be 
changed, subsequent decisions about changes in the way of work, outside image, 
and organizational design and structure will also have to be considered (Haveman, 
1992). 
Transformational organizational change implies a change of systems, not just 
a change in systems (Cameron & Ulrich, 1986). This fundamental change results in 
a new way of interpreting reality, in a different set of motives, in a higher vision of 
possibilities, not merely the implementation of alternative actions or plans (King, 
1974). Goodstein and Burke (1991) indicate that organizational transformation 
occurs when an organization faces the need to survive and must do things 
differently to continue to exist. Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli (1985) define 
frame-breaking organizational change as involving simultaneous and sharp shifts in 
strategy, power, structure, and controls due to dramatic shifts in the organization's 
environment. 20 
Burke and Litwin (1992) explain in a causal model that transformational 
organizational change occurs as a response to the external environment and directly 
affects organizational mission and strategy, the organization's leadership, and the 
culture. In turn, the transactional factors of structure, systems, management 
practices, and climate are affected. These transformational and transactional factors 
together affect motivation, which in turn, affects performance. 
A key aspect in the definition of organizational change is the paradigm shift 
a dramatic rejection of old beliefs and acceptance of new ones (Burke, 1993, 
1994). Paradigms have three main characteristics. First, there is a social matrix 
consisting of everyone who accepts a certain way of looking at the world and 
practices a way of doing things consistent with that world. Second, the paradigm 
includes a way of looking at the world. For members of an organization, this would 
include images of the organization, beliefs about how things work in the 
organization, and values about organizations and how things work in them. The 
third aspect of a paradigm is a way of doing thingsmethods that indicate ways of 
action (Ledford, Mohrman, Mohrman, & Lawler, 1989). 
According to Kuhn (1970), there are three stages to a paradigm shift: a 
period of normalcy under the present paradigm, a period in which changes begin to 
accumulate that put the paradigm at risk and create a growing sense of crisis, and 
finally a period in which the old paradigm is replaced by a new one. A new 
paradigm might emerge if the organization's ways of looking at the world and ways 21 
of doing things no longer address the problems and realities of the organization and 
its environment. 
David Nadler and Michael Tushman (1989) state that organizational change 
initiated in anticipation of future events is called reorientation, and change 
introduced in response to immediate demands is called re-creation. Research on 
patterns of organizational life and death in several industries has provided insight 
into the patterns of strategic organizational change (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) 
and include three major points: 
1.  Strategic organizational changes are necessary when various factors, 
including technology, competition, and market demands drive the organization 
either reactively or in anticipation to make changes. Organizations that do not 
change under these circumstances do not survive. 
2.  Re-creations are risky. Fewer than 1 in 10 re-creations succeed, and 
those that do, usually entail changes in the senior leadership of the organization, 
frequently involving replacement from the outside. 
3.  Re-orientations are associated with success. When reorientations are 
initiated in advance of external events, continued organizational growth is more 
likely. Again, many of the successful reorientations also involve change in the CEO 
and executive team. 
Organizational Movement Related to Life Cycle 
Kimberly and Quinn (1984) state that there are essentially three types of 
organizational transitions. Emergence transition defines the transition from when an 22 
organization is implying a possibility to its identifiable creation. Transformational 
transitions are those that punctuate the stages of mid-life of organizations. The 
termination transition signals the beginning of decline. Transformational transitions 
are only possible when certain external enabling and internal permitting conditions 
exist. 
Larger organizations that are also older organizations have often developed a 
consistent set of responses, standard operating procedures, and habits that have been 
reinforced by success in their environment (Leford et al., 1989). Significant change 
in that kind of setting requires interventions powerful enough to cause 
organizational members to question what they think they know and to engage in 
learning processes that may come as a shock. These changes are made even more 
difficult because the assumptions underlying existing organizational practices will 
have, over time, become almost completely forgotten from the consciousness of 
organizational members. 
Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli (1986) also indicate that as organizations 
grow and become more successful, they develop internal forces for stability. 
Organizational structures and systems become so interlinked that they allow only 
compatible changes. Further, over time, employees develop a sense of competence 
in knowing how to get work done within the system. These self-reinforcing patterns 
of behavior, norms, and values contribute to increased organizational complacency, 
and over time, to a sense of organizational history. This organizational complacency 
is functional as long as the organization is stable. If the organization must change, 23 
this momentum cuts the other way. Organizational history is a source of precedent 
and pride which are, in turn, anchors to the past. "A paradoxical result of long 
periods of success may be heightened organizational complacency, decreased 
organizational flexibility, and a stunted ability to learn" (Tushman, Newman, & 
Romanelli, 1986, p. 37). 
Thus older organizations that are in an ultra-stable state may be unable to 
adapt quickly to new circumstances (Kimberly & Miles, 1981; Sheldon, 1980). 
Because changing any dimension is threatening, they change none. These 
organizations function as closed systems, rejecting any information they receive that 
implies their failure, in whole or in part, because acceptance would destroy their 
stability (Neumann, 1989). In this state, keeping constant who they are and what 
they do is more important than any other consideration. Members of the 
organization collude to avoid any questioning of their ideology, and an illusion of 
unanimity is created, in which any deviation from the norm is regarded as betrayal 
or desertion (O'Toole, 1995; Riley & Baldridge, 1977). 
Organizational Movement Related to Political Dimensions 
Even though leaders may have created a readiness to change, changes of the 
magnitude of transformations are resisted in organizations because they destroy 
things. The magnitude of this kind of change requires giving up certainty for 
ambiguity, security for risk, stability for instability, and predictability for 
opportunity. Resistance of many kinds tends to emerge (Cameron & Ulrich, 1986). 24 
"Paradigmatic change requires a radical change in world view  often 
accompanied by mourning because the old world is felt to be dying" (Sheldon, 
1980, p. 64). Tichy (1983) categorized resistance forces into three different types: 
technical, political, and cultural. Technical resistance emerges from the structure 
and interaction patterns that exist in organizations. Change is often resisted, for 
example, because it threatens habitual social interaction patterns and interpersonal 
relationships (Argyris, 1993). Political resistance emerges from a disruption in 
critical organizational resources, such as power, money, and recognition. When a 
loss of rewards is threatened, resistance forces will be strong. Cultural resistance 
emerges from the values, norms, biases, and underlying assumptions that develop in 
organizations. These underlying dynamics in organizations create a special identity 
and sense of uniqueness for the organization. Cultural resistance is especially 
difficult to overcome because it is often unarticulated and unrecognized even by 
those who are resisting. It is the taken-for-granted nature of culture that makes it 
both powerful and difficult to change (Parilla, 1993). 
FORMS OF CHANGE 
Identity Change 
Large-scale organizational change is described by Ledford et al. (1989) as a 
lasting change in the character of an organization that significantly alters its 
performance. This definition comprises two constructs: change in character and 
change in performance. Organizational character includes changes in patterns by 25 
which the organization relates to its environment, including behavior and energy 
and information flows, such as communication, decision-making, participation and 
politics. Changes in character are qualitative changes, like damming a river or 
altering its course, and require changes in the organization's designs and processes, 
such as formal structures, information and decision-making systems, and human 
resource systems. Organizational performance relates to the system's effectiveness 
as measured on a number of dimensions, such as economic performance, customer 
relationships, or product orientation. 
At the most basic level, organization changes can be thought of as a move 
from a current state to a preferred future state, moving through a transition state. 
Larger-scale changes, according to David Nadler (1988) have four characteristics: 
(a) they have multiple transitions, in which changes occur with many transitions, 
some of them explicitly related to each other, others that seemingly are unrelated; 
(b) they have incomplete transitions, in which many of the transitions that are 
initiated are not completed because events or other changes overtake them; (c) they 
have uncertain future states, in which there are so many unknowns that 
organizations have limited ability to predict or describe the future; and (d) they have 
transitions over a long period of time, which is often necessary with large and 
complex structures. 
Coordination Change: Culture and Structure 
Another interpretation of change comes from ideas about the role of culture 
in organizations. Each organization has its own character, identity, and climate; it 26 
also has its own unique patterns, organization, and system of attributes that make it 
stand out in some way from other organizations of its type. 
Most research is similar in defining organizational culture as a phenomenon 
that involves beliefs and behavior; that it exists at a variety of different levels in 
organizations; and that it manifests itself in a wide range of features of 
organizational life such as structures, control and reward systems, symbols, stories, 
and organizational practices (Pettigrew, 1990). 
Attempts to purposefully manipulate culture point to one of the paradoxical 
qualities of culture. While difficult to change, culture is constantly evolving because 
of ongoing interactions and the infusion of new people and new ideas. Thus, culture 
does change. Over time, however, the substantive changes in an institution's culture 
are not necessarily predictable or controllable (Kuh & Whitt, 1988). 
Cultural change often happens because of external influences or influx of 
newcomers, often a new leader (Deal, 1986). But individuals become attached to 
values, heroes and heroines, rituals and ceremonies, and key cultural players. When 
change breaks the attachment, individuals experience loss akin to that if a close 
friend or relative dies. This loss triggers two impulses: one to cling to the past, the 
other to rush "pell mell to embrace the present or future" (Deal, 1986, p. 120). 
The past is important in organizational change. Warren Bennis (1989) 
asserts that there can be no change without history, without continuity. 
What I think most of us in institutions really want  and what status, 
money, and power serve as currency for  is acceptance, affection, 
and esteem. Institutions are more amenable to change when they 
preserve the esteem of all members. .  .  .  [Organizational members] 27 
are much freer to identify with the adaptive process and much better 
equipped to tolerate the high level of ambiguity that accompanies 
change when these needs are heeded. (p. 115) 
A successful organization creates strongly held shared assumptions and 
therefore also a strong culture (Schein, 1992). If the internal and external 
environments remain stable, this is an advantage. However, if there is a change in 
that environment, some of those shared assumptions can become a liability precisely 
because of their strength. Members of the organization are likely to want to hold 
onto them at all costs because they justify the past and are the source of pride and 
self-esteem. The assumptions operate as filters that make it difficult for people to 
understand alternative strategies for organizational renewal. 
Coordination Change: Colleges 
In relation to colleges, Tierney (1988) suggests that culture is a complex set 
of context-bound, continually evolving properties that potentially include anything 
influencing events and actions in a college or university. The core of culture is 
comprised of assumptions and beliefs shared by members of the institution that 
guide decision-making and shape major events and activities. 
A college culture is particularly unique, and colleges are proud of that image 
(Kuh, 1993). They are often extraordinarily resistant to abandoning or modifying 
the programs that have historically defined their distinctiveness (Heath, 1985). 
Change can become very difficult for colleges that have become prisoners of the 
success of what Burton Clark (1971) calls their saga, their collective understanding 
of unique accomplishment that provides a unified sense of history. Simsek and 28 
Louis (1994) report that college organizations are defined by their paradigms, the 
prevalent view of reality shared by members of the organization, and that radical 
change in organizations is construed as a discontinuous shift in this socially 
constructed reality. They found that revolutionary changes do not occur rapidly in 
colleges, and may incorporate elements of the old paradigm rather than fully 
rejecting them as change occurs. 
Smart and Hamm (1993) in a study of 2-year colleges, found four dominant 
types of organizational culture. Clan cultures emphasize shared values, goals, and 
the development of human resources. Their interactions with the external 
environment are characterized by reactive, implementor-type strategies. Internal 
transactions are guided by congruence of beliefs, trust, and tradition. The leader is 
generally considered to be a mentor, sage, or father figure. Adhocracy cultures in 
2-year colleges emphasize entrepreneurship, growth, and adaptability. Their 
interactions with the external environment are characterized by proactive, 
innovative, strategies and boundary spanning activities. Internal transactions are 
guided by a commitment to innovation and the importance of the task being 
undertaken. The leader is generally considered to be an entrepreneur, an innovator, 
or a risk taker. Hierarchy cultures emphasize the norms and values associated with 
bureaucracy, such as order and uniformity. Their interactions with the external 
environment are characterized by reactive, defender-type strategies. Internal 
transactions are governed by formally stated roles and enforced through rules and 
regulations; the leader is considered to be a coordinator or administrator. Finally, 29 
market cultures emphasize competitiveness, environmental interaction, and 
customer orientation. Their interactions with the external environment are 
characterized by proactive, market-centered initiatives. Internal transactions are 
governed by beliefs that competent performance directed toward desired 
organizational outcomes will be rewarded, and the leader is considered to be a 
producer, a technician, or a hard-driver. 
Control Change: Politics and Coalitions 
Most organizations do not have just a single culture, but at any point in time 
may have a variety of different sets of beliefs and assumptions that make up 
subcultures (Schneider, 1990; Tierney, 1990). Tension about the future 
development of the organization is often expressed in terms of the language and 
political positioning of these different subcultures. 
From a political perspective, change always will have its winners and losers, 
its contests and conflicts, its exchanges of power (Deal, 1986). It assumes that 
interests can be identified, that power can directly influence outcomes, and that 
conflicts will decide winners and losers. People enjoy their stature and power in 
organizations, and have self-interests they want to protect. When those interests are 
threatened, they form coalitions whose struggles determine whose interests will 
prevail in an area of conflict (Beer, 1980; Trice & Beyer, 1993). 
Schein (1992) posits that changing the composition of the organization's 
dominant groups or coalitions can change shared assumptions. The most potent 
version of this change is a new CEO and a new management team 30 
The new CEO usually brings in some of his or her own people and 
gets rid of people who are perceived to represent the old and 
increasingly ineffective way of doing things. In effect this destroys 
the group or hierarchical subculture that was the originator of the 
total culture and initiates a process of new culture formation. 
(Schein, 1992, p. 323) 
Dyer (1985) describes this phenomenon in a series of patterns. First, the 
organization develops a sense of crisis because of some kind of environmental 
change and decides it needs new leadership. At the same time, procedures, beliefs, 
and symbols that support the old culture break down. A new leader with new 
assumptions joins the organization, and conflict develops between the proponents of 
the old assumptions and the leadership. If the sense of crisis is eventually eased, the 
new assumptions begin to be embedded and reinforced by the new sets of patterns in 
the organization. Members who continue to cling to the old ways are either forced 
out or leave voluntarily because they no longer feel comfortable with the direction 
the organization is taking and how it does things (Nadler, Shaw, & Walton, 1995). 
LEADERSHIP ROLES IN THE CHANGE PROCESS 
Change Strategists 
Nadler and Tushman (1989) assert that successful change efforts are 
dependent on the availability of a broad range of individuals who can perform 
critical leadership functions during periods of significant organizational change. 
They state that there are three leverage points for the extension of leadership: 
building the senior leadership team, broadening the senior management, and 
developing leadership throughout the organization. There are at least five actions 31 
important to building the senior leadership team as an effective element of 
leadership in reorientation of organizations. 
According to Nadler and Tushman (1989), first there must be visible 
empowerment of the team, in which the team functions as an extension of the 
individual leader. There are two different aspects to this empowerment: objective 
and symbolic. Objective empowerment involves providing team members with the 
autonomy and resources to serve effectively as leaders of elements of the 
reorientation. Symbolic empowerment involves the creating and communicating of 
messages telling the organization that these executives are indeed extensions of the 
leader and key components of the leadership as an institution. Symbolic 
empowerment can be done through the use of titles, organizational structures, or 
ceremonial roles (Huber & Glick, 1993; Mohrman, Mohrman, Ledford, 
Cummings, & Lawler, 1989). Second, there must be individual empowerment of 
team members. A big problem in many organizational reorientations is getting 
senior team members to deal effectively with increased ambiguity and uncertainty. 
One role of the CEO is to coach, guide, and support executives in developing their 
own personal capacities for credible leadership during times of change. Third, 
attention must be given to composition of the senior team. Successful orientations 
involved significant changes in the makeup of the senior team, and this may involve 
importing different people with different skills, capacities, styles, and value 
orientations from outside the organization. Fourth, there must be some sort of 
inducement for strategic anticipation. A reorientation is a strategic organizational 32 
change that is initiated in anticipation of external events which may demand 
strategic change later on. Reorientation occurs because the organization's leadership 
thinks it can gain competitive advantage from initiating the changes earlier rather 
than later. The senior team can be helpful in scanning the environment and in 
successful organizations, has a major role in initiating, sponsoring, and leveraging 
the process of anticipation (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Fifth, and finally, the senior 
team must operate as a learning organization (Chawla & Renesch, 1995; Watkins & 
Marsick, 1993). For a senior team to benefit from the involvement in the leadership 
of change, it must become an effective system for learning about the business, the 
nature of change, and the task of managing the change. The challenge is to bond the 
team together while also preventing insularity and conformity. People on the team 
must believe that the team's success will, in the long run, be more salient to them 
than their individual short-run success (Wagner, Pfeffer, & O'Reily, 1984). 
From a college perspective, when a new president of a college takes office, 
it is certainly conceivable that an administrative structure may be unsuitable to the 
president's style or needs (Leslie & Fretwell, 1996). Changing the executive team 
structure may achieve particular operational goals. At the same time, by changing 
that structure the president also signals to the college community that life as it 
previously existed will change (Reyes & Twombly, 1987). From this perspective, 
the president's action accounts not only for structural change, but also for the 
perception of change (Tierney, 1989). 33 
A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that the top management 
team may be a more important determinant of an organization's ability to change 
and adapt than the chief executive officer alone. It is the top management team 
through which critical information is filtered and by which strategic decisions are 
made (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992). 
Recognition of the importance of the top management team should not be a surprise 
since the ability of an organization to anticipate and respond to changes in the 
environment rests on the decisions not just of the CEO, but of the entire executive 
group. Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli (1986) capture the critical role of the 
senior team's impact when they note: 
The data are consistent across diverse industries and companies, an 
executive team's ability to proactively initiate and implement frame-
breaking change and to manage divergent change seem to be 
important factors which discriminate between organizational renewal 
and greatness versus complacency and eventual decline. (p. 15) 
One role of the senior management team is to ensure that the organization 
adapts to changing circumstances (Priem, 1990). As shifts occur in environmental 
conditions or strategies, new competencies and perspectives are often required. If 
executive teams persist in old modes of conduct in fundamentally altered contexts, 
failure is likely (O'Reilly, Snyder, & Boothe, 1993). During stable periods, 
executive teams must be able to continually and incrementally improve by getting 
better at those things that offer them a competitive advantage. During change, teams 
should recognize when to reorient themselves and shift to new processes and 
competencies. Hambrick (1987) suggests that "the amounts of open-mindedness, 34 
perseverance, communication skills, vision, and other key characteristics that exist 
with the team clearly set the limits for how well the team  and in turn, the firm 
can operate" (p. 2). Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli (1986) affirm that frame-
breaking change requires direct executive involvement in all aspects of the change, 
including motivating constructive behavior, shaping political dynamics, managing 
control during the transition period, and managing external constituencies. 
Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli (1992) explore CEO succession and 
executive-team changes as important mechanisms for organizational adaptation in 
turbulent environments. They found that, while CEO succession or executive-team 
change by themselves can be resisted by recalcitrant and conservative organizations, 
the combination of CEO succession and executive team change alters team 
demographics enough to enable the senior team to take substantive action in 
turbulent environments. Further, they indicate that the effects of executive-team 
change on organizational outcomes are accentuated when these revised teams 
simultaneously initiate system-wide organization change. Executive succession 
coupled with reorientation signals the end of the old order and tends to legitimize 
sweeping organization change and system-wide learning (Bartunek & Ringuest, 
1989). 
Research indicates that the integration and functioning of the top 
management team is at least partly affected by the demographic composition of the 
team. Hambrick and Mason (1984) offer a series of propositions linking the 
demography of the senior team to organizational outcomes. They propose that 35 
homogeneous teams in terms of length of service will make strategic decisions more 
quickly than heterogeneous teams. O'Reilly and Flatt (1989) argue that homogeneity 
in the executive team may be a critical way to achieve the high levels of 
interdependence necessary for organizational innovation. Homogeneity based on 
length of service can promote identification with the large goals of the organization 
and reduce resistance to change by diminishing misunderstandings and political 
dynamics within the team. They find that homogeneity is positively associated with 
organizational innovation. In a 1993 study, O'Reilly, Snyder, and Boothe found that 
homogeneity in terms of length of service is associated with positive organizational 
outcomes during times of change. Homogeneity fosters cooperation, mutual trust, 
and an effective blend of personalities. These positive team dynamics contribute to 
increased adaptive change, reduced turnover among team members, and decreased 
frequency of political changes. 
Individuals who entered the organization during approximately the same 
time interval may have two additional significant impacts. First, the existence of 
well-defined cohorts may lead to conflict among groups over issues such as resource 
allocation and control. Second, the existence of groups of individuals who identify 
with each other and who perceive themselves to be distinct from other 
organizational members may affect the way individuals interact and perform within 
organizations (McCain, O'Reilly, & Pfeffer, 1983). To the extent that the cohorts 
become associated with ideologies prevalent at the time of their entry into the 36 
organization, it can be argued that organizational change is a process much affected 
by the organization's management demographic structure. 
Change Implementers 
Nadler and Tushman (1989) believe that moving beyond the executive and 
the senior team to include the senior management of the organization is also an 
important step to successful organizational reorientation. This group would include 
people one or two levels down from the executive team, and is usually regarded as 
the operating management in most organizations. This group may be particularly 
problematic during times of change since they may be more embedded in the 
current system of organizing and managing than some of the senior team, and may 
be less prepared to change. They have often modeled themselves to fit the current 
organizational style, and can easily feel disenfranchised by the strong executive 
team set above them, particularly if that team has been assembled by bringing in 
people from outside the organization. Nadler and Tushman (1989) assert that the 
answer is to help this group feel part of the change, such as creating structures such 
as councils and committees to signify their participation as members of senior 
management, and to involve them in the early diagnosing of the need to change and 
the planning of change strategies associated with the organization's reorientation. 
Maintaining a constant stream of open communication to and from this group is 
important, since the lack of information and perspective disenfranchises the 
members psychologically and makes them feel excluded. 37 
In an empirical study of large-scale change from the perspective of 
stakeholder groups, Covin and Kilmann (1989) found that middle-level managers 
play an extremely important role in change efforts, and that lack of support and 
commitment of middle-managers has an extremely negative impact on the success of 
large-scale change efforts. Other responses indicated that the role of mid-managers 
should be one of skilled leadership, not passive commitment. 
Change Recipients 
Change recipients often feel differently about the changes occurring within 
their organization than their managers would predict. This may be especially true in 
a college environment (Corbett, Firestone, & Rossman, 1987). A few recent studies 
underscore the differences in faculty and administrator beliefs and perceptions about 
their organizations. In a study of individual perceptions of organizational goals in 
higher education, Birnbaum (1987) did an analysis of the responses of senior 
administrators and faculty leaders on 32 campuses. He concluded that there is great 
inconsistency toward goals among institutional participants, with respondents in 
universities and community colleges expressing the least consistency in articulations 
of the goals of their institutions. Blackburn and Lawrence (1990), in a 
representative national survey of faculty and administrators, found consistent 
differences between faculty and administrator views of the organization on several 
dimensions, including views of the organizational climate, academic workplace, and 
administrative supportiveness. Administrators appear to place more stress on values 
as the primary educational purpose, view the nature of the organization as slightly 38 
more entrepreneurial, see a more supportive organizational and administrative 
climate, and have a more favorable view of faculty motivation (Peterson & White, 
1992). "Incremental change is compatible with the existing structure of an 
organization and is reinforced over a period of years. In contrast, frame-breaking 
change is abrupt, painful to participants, and often resisted by the old guard" 
(Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986, p. 32). 
In another survey of nearly 4,000 college faculty and 500 college 
administrators from around the country, data showed that administrators believe 
they can be trusted to act in good faith for the betterment of their institutions. 
Faculty, however, indicate they lack the same level of faith in their administrators 
(Blackburn & Lawrence, 1990; Cameron, 1981). Curry (1992) explained the 
important relationship of change recipients to the overall organizational change: 
Although leaders might be empowered to initiate change, they are not 
often in a position to dictate commitment. In an ideal organization, 
people understand the necessity for change and support it 
accordingly. In real organizations, commitment follows discussion 
and often follows debates that help create the setting for change by 
facilitating reconciliation of differences and helping to further 
development of innovation. The exchange of ideas, often 
accompanied by much enthusiasm, conviction, and frequently 
acrimony, makes it more difficult for organizations to return to 
business as usual. This part of the process of change has been 
described as chaotic, in part because it is uncomfortable for some 
people and because it often leads to unpredictable outcomes. It could 
be, however, that the catharsis that also takes place during debate 
permits movement forward. (p. 42) 39 
SUMMARY  
It is apparent that large-scale organization changes are risky, hard, complex, 
unpredictable, and emotionally intense. All of these characteristics become more 
severe as the change becomes more pervasive, and as the depth of change increases, 
the risk, difficulty, and intensity of the change also become greater. 
Chapter III will describe the methodology utilized in this case study, which 
was based on a single-case descriptive design, its limitations, and the form of the 
analysis used. The data are "pulled through" a specific theoretical framework in 
Chapters IV and V to explore the conceptual linkages between the new senior 
leadership team at Seaview Community College and organizational change. The 
study analyzed specific events to determine how the forces of change impacted the 
college and the new leadership team and the extent to which the team was able to 
consciously affect organizational change through their leadership actions and 
decisions. 40 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
This study explored the organizational impact of significant change in 
leadership at a mature community college during the initial period of that change. 
The case study describes and characterizes the nature of change in the organization 
during the periods of significant leadership transition, and examines the conceptual 
links between the new leadership team and the external and internal forces of 
change impacting the college during that time. 
This study does not purport to test theory. Rather, through a detailed and 
rich descriptive analysis of several key events and decisions, it describes and 
characterizes the nature of change in the organization during the period of 
significant leadership transition. As in all qualitative research, there are no 
recommendations or applications to this data other than what is contained in this 
study, but there are patterns that might suggest hypotheses that merit further 
discussion or research. Those patterns are discussed in Chapter V. 
While outside forces of change are important to consider in organizational 
change, it is also a fact of life that organizations also have power to shape behavior. 
This is not the work of just culture, but rather the formal aspects of the 
organization, such as its distribution of roles and responsibilities, authority to 
commit resources, existing procedures and processes, information access, and 41 
reward and recognition systems. These elements, when shifted, can change the 
behavior of an organization. 
This study endeavored to pull significant events, actions, and circumstances 
of the new top leadership team in the selected college through a specific theoretical 
framework to find links of relationship and connection. That framework defines 
organizational change as a coalition of interests and a network of activities within a 
moving structure impacted by a combination of past events, pushes arising from the 
environment, and pulls from dominant coalitions. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Rosabeth Moss Kanter asserts that three clusters of forces create motion in 
and around organizations that triggers change (Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992). The 
first is the relationships between organizations and their environments. The second 
is organic, growth through the life cycle of an organization. The third is political, 
the constant struggle for power. All three occur outside of strategic intention. They 
represent the forces that keep the organization in constant motion and require a 
response if the organization is going to proactively attain its official organizational 
goals. 
Thus while the organizational leaders are trying to act, the organization is a 
moving target. It is blown around by environmental winds, it grows and ages as 
players move in and out of the organization, and it is shaped by internal power 42 
struggles. Sometimes the forces are long-term and slow; sometimes they are acute 
and cause crises. 
But organizations can also change their relationship to their environments by 
restructuring or redefining their identity and boundaries. They can change the ways 
in which they operate, the ways people and units relate to each other, through 
changes in internal coordination. They can change the nature of their control 
structures that govern the organization and determine how benefits are distributed 
among them. These are shifts in organizational form that change strategists and 
leaders within an institution can productively act on to effect change. 
In viewing the specific events at Seaview Community College through the 
lens of Kanter's framework (Kanter et al., 1992), this study analyzed how the forces 
of change impacted the college and the new leadership team, and how the team was 
able to consciously affect organizational change through their leadership actions and 
decisions. 
THE CASE STUDY APPROACH 
The case study methodology has come under increasing acceptance as a 
research strategy that complements other scientific approaches and contributes to 
theory development (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Robert Yin (1994) says that a 
"case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident" (p.13). According to Yin (1994), the case study 43 
method is a comprehensive research strategy that is most appropriate for the 
situation that has many more variables of interest than data points. The case study 
approach is particularly relevant for this study because of the complex and 
overlapping issues, forces, and events inherent in large-scale organizational change. 
The single-case design of this study was utilized because the case 
represented a particularly unique set of circumstances. Seaview Community College 
experienced the turnover of a president, four of five vice-presidents, and multiple 
mid-level managers all within a 12-month time period. Seaview had been relatively 
stable internally and externally for over 30 years, making the changes all the more 
significant. It would be difficult to fmd another 2-year college in the country in 
which those circumstances could be replicated for study. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Data collection procedures in case study methodology are not routinized 
(Yin, 1994), but specific protocol was designed to increase the reliability of the 
research. Planning and conducting the fieldwork was especially crucial given the 
global nature of the research questions and the need to use multiple sources of 
evidence (Fiedler, 1987). 
Research included the review of documents, archival records, direct 
observations, participant observation, and interviews (see Appendix). Document 
review included the examination of letters, memos, agendas and minutes of 
meetings, newsletters, media reports, and selected college-wide documents that 44 
provided background or insight. These documents also promoted an understanding 
of the atmosphere and perceptions that surrounded the administrative changes. 
Because the institution involved in the research had a 30-year history, it was useful 
also to study some archival records that described past administrative structures and 
budgets. The college also produced a monthly or quarterly internal magazine for 
virtually that entire time period, and past archived issues were searched for cultural 
and historical patterns of organizational behavior. 
Two types of interviews were used in the research design. The first was 
open-ended and situation-based, in which information was gathered in natural 
settings through notation and analysis of spontaneous actions and reactions 
regarding events or decisions as they occurred. These subjects were randomly 
selected based on their connection and proximity to the change process. Careful 
field notes were kept noting responses. 
Focused interviews also were used, in which six employees of the institution 
at varying levels from different departments were separately interviewed. The six 
respondents were selected because they were known to have specific and important 
historical roles in the institution and represented diverse jobs, perspectives, and 
classifications within the institution. 
As a qualitative case study research project, no formal query instruments 
were utilized. To attain a rich description of a culture and campus that was being 
clearly impacted by change unusual in its history, a structure that allowed the 
research subjects to tell their stories without judgement or restraint, was employed. 45 
The following questions were used to guide the subject into talking about the issues 
related to the study: 
1.  Tell me about your history with the college. 
2.  There have been a lot of changes in the past year here. Could you 
talk about that? What are your perceptions of those changes? 
3.  Can you tell me a story or example of how the college is impacted by 
these changes? 
4.  How do you think these changes affect you? 
5.  How do you feel about the changes? 
6.  How do you think the changes are impacting the college as a whole? 
7.  How have the changes made you feel? 
8.  What do you think is going to happen at the college now? 
The majority of interviews were not tape-recorded, as it was quickly 
discovered that participants were much more willing to be candid, and were able to 
be more fluid in their thinking, without the recorder. However, careful field notes 
were developed. Each interview lasted 1 to 2 hours, and what was surprising was 
the extent to which the researcher was thanked for allowing them to talk frankly 
about their feelings in a both exciting as well as challenging time in the college's 
history. The interviews were semi-structured, and while the conversation was 
guided the conversation generally in the direction of their perceptions of change at 
the college, there were no limits or parameters imposed on their feedback. This was 46 
primarily because it was important to gain information on the informal, as well as 
formal, impacts of change, and that is often measured from an emotional standpoint. 
By triangulating document research with observation and interviews, it was 
possible analyze not only the formal ways the college was changing, but more 
importantly, the vital informal, and often unwritten, parts of any large change 
process. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Any research design possesses inherent limitations and shortcomings. The 
methodology employed in this study is not exempted from this risk. As a qualitative 
study, it is open to bias from researcher interpretation, especially as a participant 
observer, as described above. It is the researcher's belief that because of the 
variation of data-gathering techniques as well as having some objectivity as a new 
player in the institution, some of this bias was mitigated. 
The case study methodology was chosen because of its suitability to the 
research of organizational change. The in-depth look at the variables studied 
provided the needed context to assess the applicability of the general models in 
organizational change. The nature of qualitative research, however, implies reliance 
on subjectivity. Assumptions and values are difficult to quantify. Informant 
memories pose the obstacle of becoming dimmed or blurred over time. 
Triangulation by using multiple sources of data helped to combat these problems, 
but such challenges are inherent in thick and descriptive research studies. 47 
Chapter IV contains the full case study description of organization change at 
Seaview Community College using the theoretical construct of Kanter et al.'s (1992) 
three organizational forces of change and three forms of change. Chapter V seeks to 
answer the research questions and analyze and interpret the findings as well as 
suggest further research. 48 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION AND FINDINGS 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MOTION 
Kanter focuses on three kinds of movement, both internal and external, that 
influence organizational change (Kanter et al., 1992). The first movement is the 
motion of the organization as a whole as it relates to motion in its environment, 
change that is macroevolutionary, historical, and frame-breaking in its influence. 
The second movement is the motion of the parts of the organization in relation to 
one another as the organization grows, ages, and progresses through its life cycle, 
change that is microevolutionary, developmental, and typically related to shape and 
process. The third kind of motion is the struggle for control among individuals and 
groups with a stake in the organization to make decisions to enjoy benefits as an 
expression of their own interest, change that focuses on political dimensions. 
Kanter's three forces (Kanter et al., 1992) are used to frame, reflect, and 
describe some of the circumstances that influenced organizational change at Seaview 
Community College before and during the time of the research study. 
Motion of Environment: The New Seaview 
In Kanter's model (Kanter et al., 1992), the motion of the whole 
organization as it relates to movement in its environment is the first force of 
change. Seaview Community College's environment was changing significantly. 49 
For almost 30 years, students with the goal of transfer to a 4-year college or 
university had poured through its doors. Enrollment concerns had never been an 
issue, and faculty often touted Seaview's reputation for excellence as the reason 
their classes had always been full. In fact, Seaview's reputation for academic 
education in the local school districts and neighborhoods had indeed been strong, 
and many families had chosen to send their children bound for baccalaureate degree 
programs to Seaview for 2 years prior to transferring. In any case, Seaview had 
never had any reason to institute a marketing budget, nor do any special 
programming based on community needs. The traditional junior college reputation 
and operational expectations to match had resulted in a stable student population. 
There were not even any professional-technical programs at Seaview until the 
decade of the 1980s, and there was much faculty discussion about the need and 
appropriateness of technical education programs becoming a part of Seaview's 
offerings. There were few evening offerings, and almost no afternoon classes. 
Which classes were offered, and at what times and days, were chosen by the faculty 
who were teaching them. If there was a conflict because of space, seniority 
prevailed. 
But in the first 5 years of the 1990s, many things had begun to look different 
for Seaview. Unexpected competition for students was the first. Seaview is a 
suburban college in a large metropolitan area, and most students can drive to at 
least six community or technical colleges within an hour's commute from their 
homes. These other colleges who did not have the luxury of resting on a reputation 50 
like Seaview's had begun to proactively solicit input and partnerships from their 
communities, and had been rapidly developing new programs and services in 
response to those efforts. They were paying more attention to customer service, 
while students at Seaview continued to wait in long lines for registration along with 
similar other frustrations. Other colleges had marketing budgets and used them. 
They also were forming relationships with their local business and industry bases 
and with their local school districts. Based on population demographics, there were 
simply fewer students of traditional college-age alive at that time, which would have 
impacted Seaview's enrollment even without any other variables. But other colleges 
were also beginning to attract the students that Seaview had traditionally expected. 
At the same time, state funding for community colleges was becoming a 
significant problem. There was more competition for fewer dollars, and the 
standard allocation model on which community colleges had depended for many 
years was restructured to give colleges more money for technology, professional 
technical programs, and serving basic skills students. There had been several recent 
political wins in which some large sums of money were allocated to community 
colleges, but their use was limited for use with specific constituent groups, such as 
laid-off workers, and colleges received the money primarily through an RFP 
process for new programs. Partnerships with external groups of labor and business 
were a strong criteria for receiving the funding, so colleges that had already built 
those relationships scooped up most of the available dollars. 51 
Seaview Community College had always taken pride in their faculty who 
were highly recognized in their academic fields, and technology had largely been 
viewed as impersonal and artificial compared to the high-touch advantage of 
student-centered faculty. There were few computer labs, no Internet access, and few 
faculty either had an up-to-date computer on their desk or knew how to use the one 
that did. However, the K-12 system in the state had been focusing on technology as 
both a vehicle for student learning as well as a tool needed to prepare students for 
the workplace. The suburban school districts were especially well funded via local 
levies, and the school district in Seaview's area became a technology model and 
center. Suddenly, 17-year-old students were showing up in Seaview's first-year 
courses demanding computer access and knowledge to which faculty were unable to 
respond. 
The geographical area itself was also changing. Seaview had several affluent 
bedroom communities that still sent many of their students to the college, students 
that Seaview was familiar with serving who were well-prepared academically and 
emotionally for traditional higher education. But these students no longer were the 
largest population at the college. Instead, large populations of non-native refugees 
were taking advantage of housing that was much cheaper than in the city, and they 
and their families were showing up in the front of the college registration line. Laid-
off older workers needing rapid retraining were asking about programs. And 
finally, more and more students who were not baccalaureate degree-bound but who 
expected to enter the workplace upon finishing a 2-year degree were coming to 52 
campus. Faculty were perplexed that they seemed to be unable to serve these new 
populations well through traditional classes and services. The mission of Seaview 
was changing, even though no formal decree had been issued. 
The city of Seaview also incorporated, lending definition for the first time to 
a real sense of community for the college. As the incorporation progressed, the 
college was recognized as the area's highest employer, and its presence and voice 
began to be noticed. Many questions from the community began to float over the 
campus walls that reflected some intellectual curiosity about what the college was 
doing inside its classrooms, and why. 
In the midst of these environmental changes, the previous president of 
Seaview Community College retired amongst many accolades. A new president was 
hired who had a reputation for collaboration, vision, and forward-thinking. During 
his first year at Seaview, he spent most of his time doing two things: pulling 
together his administrative team and scanning the external environment. Because of 
retirements and some restructuring, 14 of the 24 total administrators at the college 
changed during a short time period. More significantly, he hired in that first year 
four of five new vice-presidents, all from the outside, thereby creating an entirely 
new top leadership unit. The hires were not without controversy, and there was a 
clear rumbling heard in many hallways reflecting fear of the unknown. 
During his first few months, the new president also formed strong 
relationships with all of the new city government officials, business and industry 
leaders, school district personnel, and local legislators. On campus, he formed a 53 
strategic planning committee comprised of key leaders on campus from every 
constituent group and asked them to develop a strategic plan for the college in a 9-
month period. He hired a recently retired vice-president of student services to 
facilitate the effort, and while the president did not sit on the committee, he did 
offer input into each part of the process, including a section in the plan on 
environment, which he suggested might drive the direction of the plan. Though the 
president had been explicit in the need for Seaview to move out of its traditional 
box, he wanted the impetus for change to come from the internal constituency. 
The Strategic Planning Council, as it was now called, was given a budget 
and high visibility, and soon they were taking their job very seriously. Their first 
task was to describe the future environment in which Seaview would operate, and 
then to define Seaview's core values that were important to consider in developing a 
strategic plan. The first line of the document was written to say, "The environment 
in which Seaview Community College operates is changing and will continue to 
change significantly in the future." Many realities of the changing environment were 
listed, along with their implications. 
Blending the core values with the realities of the changing environment was 
the beginning of new organizational movement. Faculty and staff at Seaview saw 
themselves as being the "premier community college in the region," and in fact, 
those words comprise the new vision statement. But what did that mean? 
In the interviews conducted for this research, participants were asked to 
describe the changes taking place at the college. Every participant spoke proudly 54 
about the historical reputation of Seaview's high-quality programs, departments, 
and teaching. Past students of Seaview were cited who, after graduating from the 
local university, said their classes or teachers at Seaview were more challenging or 
difficult than at the university, and they had thus learned more at Seaview. The 
participants used anecdotal examples illustrating the pride of faculty commitment to 
students, including a story about a science instructor who was teaching in an old 
classroom with no equipment who was still rated best teacher by a student speaker 
at commencement. 
Most of the participants did see the environment influencing changes at 
Seaview, but many were concerned about it. The following quote from a faculty 
member reflects this feeling: 
The reason many students have come here is because of its 
reputation. I think we still have high-quality programs, but we are 
being pressured, I think, to be a different sort of college. The 
students we now have are just not ready for what we can give them, 
so we have to alter the way we teach, and sometimes even what we 
teach. Maybe it's good to think differently, but I'd hate to see 
Seaview's identity of the best college in the area diminish because we 
are trying to be too many things to too many people. 
Motion of Life Cycle: The Pulse of Seaview 
The change in the motion of the parts of the organization in relation to one 
another as the organization grows, ages, and progresses through its life cycle is the 
second type of organizational movement in Kanter's model (Kanter et al., 1992). 
Early in September 1996, the new leadership team had been fully formed at 
Seaview. The president believed that in order to accomplish the goals that were 55 
driven by funding and external variables, he and his top leadership team would need 
to understand the internal wiring of the culture of the institution. 
They began by hiring a consultant team to facilitate a workshop to which all 
administrators were required to attend. Prior to the first session, participants were 
asked to interview five people  students, faculty, and staff  to obtain their 
perceptions about several items. The five questions they were to ask were: 
1.  After the changes of this past year, what are the three most 
significant challenges facing Seaview community College during the upcoming 
year? 
2.  What three institutional processes/procedures are most in need of 
change at Seaview Community College and should be changed during the upcoming 
year? 
3.  What are the three most important strengths of Seaview Community 
College? 
4.  In order to find solutions to the issues that require change at Seaview 
Community College, should the institution (a)move more slowly, (b) pick up the 
pace, (c) move much faster, or (d) continue at the current pace? 
5.  As Seaview Community College continues to deal with change, what 
are your three most important concerns or fears as we begin this next academic 
year? 
Most managers came prepared with extensive notes from their interviews. 
The group was broken into small groups of mixed managerial styles to share their 56 
findings about each of the five questions, and agree on five significant issues facing 
Seaview, five opportunities for Seaview, and suggested solutions or actions to each. 
The results of this kaleidoscope exercise are summarized below by theme 
uniformity. 
Question 1. After the changes of this past year, what are the three most 
significant challenges facing Seaview community College during the upcoming 
year? 
1.  Improve enrollment. If we don't get more students in the door, our 
status quo will be threatened. 
2.  Improve morale, trust, campus communications, and develop a 
governance model that reflects our values. 
3.  Identify the roles and responsibilities of the Vice-Presidents and the 
reporting structure. 
4.  Develop an organization that can understand and deal with change in 
a trusting and positive manner. 
5.  Successfully complete a good faculty contract negotiations process. 
Question 2. What three institutional processes/procedures are most in need 
of change at Seaview Community College and should be changed during the 
upcoming year? 
1.  Establish a new governance structure for the college. 57 
2.  Develop clear college budgeting procedures, including time lines and 
how funds are allocated. 
3.  Develop clear personnel hiring procedures including time lines and 
involvement of college constituents. 
4.  Develop better college communications procedures, including how 
college information is disseminated. 
5.  Develop better processes for class schedule development and use of 
facilities. 
6.  Clarify campus-wide planning and decision-making procedures. 
Question 3. What are the three most important strengths of Seaview 
Community College? 
1.  The college has a dedicated faculty, staff, and administration. 
2.  The college has a positive reputation and strong educational 
programs. 
3.  The college values diversity, has a beautiful campus physical 
environment, and rich student involvement. 
4.  There is a genuine concern for student success at the college. 
Question 4. In order to find solutions to the issues that require change at 
Seaview Community College, should the institution (a) move more slowly, (b) pick 
up the pace, (c) move much faster, or (d) continue at the current pace? 
1.  The college must pick up the pace of change, but think first. 58 
2.  Somewhere between current practice and pick up the pace of change 
with more time for analysis must be provided. 
3.  The college must move much faster, but with regard to specific 
issues only. 
Question 5. As Seaview Community College continues to deal with change, 
what are your three most important concerns or fears as we begin this next 
academic year? 
1.  What are the consequences of change: change just for change sake, 
job insecurity, lack of direction, lip service versus follow-through. 
2.  There is a sense of loss of a feeling of family community, history, 
and trust, including a possible lack of inclusion in decision-making. 
3.  Some long-time college programs might be dropped; established 
policies and procedures and usual links of communications feel weak. 
4.  In the midst of all of this change, it is not clear that there is a master 
plan and a sense of direction for the college that honors our reputation for 
excellence. Are we trading quality for dollars? 
5.  We may lose knowledgeable staff, experience faculty burnout, and 
have to deal with ambiguity about the meld of past and present practices, all of 
which lessens trust in the workplace. 59 
Motion of Political Dimensions: Night Classes 
Kanter's third kind of organizational movement is reflected in the struggle 
for power and control among individuals and groups with a stake in the organization 
to make decisions to enjoy benefits as an expression of their own interests (Kanter 
et al., 1992). 
As Seaview's enrollment continued to dip, the president and the top 
leadership team began to focus on more aggressive actions to combat the downward 
spiral. One strategy was to increase the number of night classes and services 
offered. This was relayed to the division chairs, who were asked to discuss it in 
greater detail in their monthly division meetings. (These division meetings had not 
occurred before the new president mandated them. Heretofore, communication had 
occurred informally in the hallways during the afternoons when there were no 
classes or students.) After the division meeting had taken place, the senior 
leadership team received a memo signed by all division chairs articulating the 
desperate need for better lighting on campus at night. Faculty had universally 
expressed a strong sense of being unsafe at Seaview at night; there were too few 
lights on campus, and the mature trees on the beautiful Seaview campus blocked the 
lights that were there. Both students and faculty were at risk of hurting themselves 
by not being able to see clearly, and students described the atmosphere as "creepy." 
Night classes would clearly not be successful until there was a remedy for the 
security issue. 60 
The president's team considered the options. The logical first choice was to 
trim or cut down the trees that were blocking the existing lights. The president 
asked the facilities director to do an analysis and bring back the findings. The 
subsequent analysis showed that while most of the trees could be significantly 
trimmed, several trees had simply grown beyond the capacity of the space they were 
in to support them, and by removing them, it would provide not only more light, 
but more room for the trees beside them to thrive. The team agreed to give the 
facilities director the approval to implement that plan. 
The landscape contractor arrived with a truck on the following Monday 
morning, which is the regularly scheduled time for the president's team to meet. 
Midway through the meeting, a secretary interrupted the group to report that there 
was a group of faculty and staff standing outside blocking the work of the 
contractor. The president went outside to investigate, and was told by the group that 
no trees would be cut that day on that campus. The group indicated that they were 
angry that they had not been a part of this decision that clearly impacted the entire 
campus, especially since the president had said that he was committed to inclusive 
decision-making. They also described their personal investment in these trees. 
More than 30 years ago, when the fledgling Seaview campus was nothing 
more than dirt and rocks, the president at that time issued a heartfelt plea to the 
faculty and staff to donate a weekend to help plant tiny tree seedlings on the multi-
acre campus. In a burst of cooperative team spirit, most of the campus personnel 
accepted the invitation and planted trees together all day in the sun while the 61 
campus band played and the president's wife served Kool-Aid. The people standing 
in front of the contractor's truck had carefully set those seedlings in the earth 30 
years before. 
The current president thanked them for their care and concern, and went 
back to his president's team meeting. They considered options again. If trees were 
not cut down, then perhaps a few additional lights could simply be installed adjacent 
to the trees. 
The following Monday, the facilities director reported that more large lights 
could indeed be installed, but in doing so, it would violate the energy conservation 
agreement that had been implemented a decade ago. This energy agreement had 
been a part of a faculty environmental committee recommendation, which had gone 
to cabinet for approval, and ultimately to the board of trustees. The president's team 
recommended that members of that committee be contacted to give input into the 
decision to change the agreement so that the lights could be installed and evening 
classes could commence. 
The members of the committee were contacted, met separately as a group, 
and the following week, the item appeared on the cabinet agenda. The discussion 
was heated and centered around not only the lights and the energy agreement, but 
also around the decision-making process. Since a sub-unit of cabinet had originally 
had the responsibility for the campus environment, shouldn't that unit, and cabinet, 
be the decision-makers for this problem? Moreover, if the board of trustees had 
once approved the policy, they would need to approve any changes  and all policy 62 
changes traditionally were sent through cabinet prior to approval. Questions about 
governance appeared in that week's faculty union newsletter, along with a thinly 
veiled editorial comment about a question of trust in the new administration. 
On Monday, the president's team met again. While the president was 
untangling the issue in cabinet, the vice-presidents agreed to ask their respective 
staffs for input and suggestions regarding the lighting problem. By this time, a short 
and a long-term solution was needed if night classes were going to be implemented 
the next quarter. One of the suggestions brought to the table was stringing small 
twinkle Christmas lights around the darkest edges of campus, thereby creating at 
least an illusion of light and safety while a permanent solution was explored. The 
lights were priced reasonably and could even be used afterwards for special events. 
The president's team gave the go-ahead. 
The following Monday, the president's team opened the student newspaper 
to find an editorial sharply criticizing the administration for not considering the 
cultural impact of using lights manufactured in support of the Christian religion. 
The local community media regularly receives copies of the student newspaper, and 
later that day, a reporter called the president asking him to comment on the 
situation. 
MANAGING CHANGE 
Kanter's three kinds of movement help distinguish three basic forms of 
organizational change (Kanter et al., 1992). Identity changes are the changes in the 63 
relationships between the organization as an entity and its environment. 
Coordination changes involve the internal array of parts and processes constituting 
the organization. Control changes stress the political coalitions, or set of interests 
that drive the organization. 
The new leadership team at Seaview implemented many decisions during 
their first few months. This case study uses Kanter's three forms of organizational 
change (Kanter et al., 1992) to describe the context and results of three separate 
actions intended by the team to influence or manage organizational change at 
Seaview. 
Identity: New Letterhead 
In Kanter's model (Kanter et al., 1992), organizational movement related to 
environment usually leads to organizational change in identity. Identity changes are 
caused through reformulation of an organization's relationship to its environment as 
environmental movement presents pressures and opportunities for change. 
Letterhead supplies for the college were running short during this first year 
of change at Seaview, and the president heaved a secret sigh of relief. The logo for 
the college had been in existence for many years, and although it was originally 
designed to be a symbol incorporating Native American beliefs, it resembled a 
nuclear reactor in design. The paper color of the letterhead was a pale avocado 
green, with matching accompanying envelopes. 
The president asked the public information office to come up with some 
alternate designs for a new logo and stationary, and after looking at several, the 64 
leadership team selected one. They asked the public information office to send a 
memo to about 30 selected faculty and staff inviting them to a short meeting at 
which the new stationary design would be presented for feedback and input. The 
letter was sent, and only two people came to the meeting, neither having any strong 
feelings about the change. The clean new logo design and white stationary was then 
officially approved, although the president asked that all existing supplies of paper 
for the college be used up before ordering the new. The new logo began to appear 
gradually and quietly on business cards for new employees, on new signs, and on 
invitations to special events, and no comments about it were heard. 
Three months later, the supply of existing letterhead ran out, and new 
letterhead was finally ordered for the entire campus. A cheery memo was sent from 
the public information office to all campus departments informing them that they 
would be receiving new paper soon, and gave instructions on what should be done 
with any unused green envelopes or paper. 
Within 2 hours of the memo being received, the phone lines of the entire top 
leadership team, including the president, lit up. The head of the faculty union called 
enraged that the president's campaign promises of collaboration were obviously a 
lie. The art department faculty called the vice-president for instruction to ask why 
they had not been consulted. The registration staff were frantic that the new 
letterhead and their existing informational brochures, which they still had many of, 
did not match. The vice-president for business was asked repeatedly how money 
had been allocated for this expense. The student newspaper called, politely 65 
inquiring why the new administration was no longer honoring the cultural diversity 
reflected in the former logo. The former president of the college, whose wife was 
still a tenured faculty member at Seaview, called to suggest some design 
improvements. 
Coordination: Budget Process I 
Organizational movement related to life cycle often is reflected through 
organizational change in coordination. Coordination relates to the problems of shape 
and structure of the internal array of parts in the organization that emerges as it 
grows and changes  in other words, how the units of the organization work 
together to execute their tasks. The need to change the organization's internal 
configuration, rather than simply let it evolve, may ultimately result in deliberate 
reshaping or revitalizing. 
Seaview had long had a budget process that was controlled exclusively by 
the president and budget officer, was unrelated to any program assessment, and had 
a reputation of being arbitrary based on who the president's favorite people or 
causes were. After thoughtful consideration and much feedback from many campus 
constituents, the president and senior leadership team decided to implement a new 
budget planning process that was tied to program review and assessment. 
The leadership team carefully formulated a plan that would change the 
budget process to one that would be driven from the bottom-up, allowing for 
maximum input. Each department in the college would first receive a copy of its 
base budget. Many had never seen their own budgets since expenses had only been 66 
tracked at the macro division or area level. They would receive instructions on how 
to begin to assess their own department effectiveness, which could include 
measuring such things as number of students served, student-teacher ratios, 
employment statistics, and other data. Then they would meet as a department to 
prioritize their next year's budget requests together, and that single list would then 
go to the division level. The department heads in each division would meet as a 
group to prioritize their division budget request into a single list. The division 
directors or deans in that area would then meet to meld their area's priorities into a 
single list that would be submitted to their vice-president. The vice-presidents 
would then work together to formulate the single campus budget priority list that the 
president and board of trustees could approve. 
This process took 6 months to complete. The top leadership team made 
themselves available to talk through the process many times with important 
constituent groups. More than any other administrative change thus far, this new 
process felt unsettling to many on campus. The following comments, the first from 
a faculty member and the second from a classified staff member, represent the 
concerns and misperceptions that were shared by many at the college: 
As a faculty member, I think it's great that we finally get some input 
into the budget process. I mean, who knows better what the science 
instructors need than science teachers? Still, I am nervous about this 
program review stuff. My second year biology course historically has 
a low count. Are they going to cancel classes now unless they are 
packed to the gills? Also, I've heard a rumor that some programs 
could even be totally thrown away through this process because their 
student count is so low, or because graduates aren't getting jobs in 
that field. I can't believe that would actually happen, though, given 67 
the quality faculty we have here  doing away with a total program 
would be such a waste of talent. 
Coming from financial aid, I think this new change is super. We will 
finally have an opportunity to get what we need! And we will be able 
to decide that, NOT the president who doesn't know me from Adam. 
I don't know about the program assessment pieces, though. Maybe 
that's a better fit for instruction. I just hope they don't measure us on 
those stupid customer service surveys or whatever. You know, most 
people who fill those out are just mad that they didn't get their way. 
At any rate, we've needed new furniture in our area for literally 
decades, and it will be a breath of fresh air to finally get some. 
As the process unfolded, the senior leadership team began to get calls from 
departments. Though everyone had conceptually understood the process, actually 
operationalizing it was now turning up some unexpected surprises, and not a little 
consternation. It appeared that coming up with one prioritized list in each 
department required decision-making techniques that were unfamiliar. In years past, 
the president had simply made the budget decisions, and department personnel 
would share much common dissatisfaction with the way their department was 
treated in that process. Strong collegiality within the department grew with shared 
commiseration. 
Now, however, the new process required the department to come up with 
one single list together. Putting one person's priority over another's was 
uncomfortable and felt like competition with colleagues. They were disconcerted by 
the inherent value implications: how can a microscope be more or less important 
than a new computer? The struggle continued at the next level of the process in 
which department heads painfully developed one single list for their division. The 
department head of dental hygiene complained that she had to give up on several 68 
other priority items because her department had one very large cost item that she 
had to lobby to put at the top of the list. She was concerned about the equity of this, 
given that her department had higher cost equipment and needs than most of the 
others in her division. The department head of physical education wondered if, even 
though they were in the same division, it was fair to put his department in 
competition with heath-related departments, since their focus was so different. He 
wondered if physical education could be considered separately. 
The division directors and deans felt the hardest emotional hit, because 
merging their lists into one meant that they would need to figure out how to balance 
the politics of the decisions with the reality of the process. The academic division 
chairs met from 9:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. on one day to come to closure on the list 
that they would submit as a unit. The following quote from a division chair 
describes the process. 
I can't believe how hard that was to do. I know every single item on 
my division's list was so carefully thought about by the department 
and faculty involved  for a long time that day, I couldn't accept that 
ANY of my division's priorities shouldn't be totally funded. But 
ultimately I realized that that is the process, and I had to buckle 
down. However, I am not looking forward to going back to the 
English department and telling them that tools for the Automotive 
program ended up higher on the Instruction list than their 
developmental English software, which they've only wanted for 
about 20 years or so. They'd make good use of it, too, I know, and it 
would be great for students. They'll all probably think I was a total 
mouse. But the automotive program has gotten such high press lately 
because of being chosen best vocational program in the whole 
country and all that, and my English friends are such notorious poops 
about doing any little extra thing, it was hard in that environment to 
argue anything other than the way it came out. Still, I'm not sure it's 
right. And I sure as hell can't tell them all that. 69 
Control: Budget Process II 
An organization consists of many actors with divergent interests, 
preferences, and criteria for organizational goals and performance. As the 
organization experiences movement in its political dimensions, emerging changes in 
control follow. Control determines which sets of interests predominate in the 
organization. 
The decision about the number of new faculty to hire or replace had been 
extrapolated earlier in the process so that the recruitment process could begin on 
time, and division chairs had come to agreement using the same process. Through 
that process, the science division had not gotten a much-desired math lab faculty 
position. When the department heads from science met later to come up with their 
prioritized list for the division, the division director suggested putting the math lab 
position at the top of the division list, since surely each division would at least get 
their first one or two priorities funded. Others pointed out that the faculty decisions 
had already been decided earlier, and it might not be in their best interest to put 
something at the very top of their list that might be ignored. The division director 
assured them that he, "knew how to play this game  just trust me on this one." But 
when the division lists were ultimately merged, that item was not considered. 
The budget process continued at Seaview. When the overall college priority 
list was finally distributed, the top leadership team was requested to attend the next 
science division meeting. The division director stood in the corner with his arms 
folded. Faculty got up one by one to present cases for outdated equipment, 70 
classified support positions, technology necessary for programs to stay current in 
their fields, and finally, the math lab faculty position. A faculty member of 30 years 
stood up with great ceremony to express his feelings: 
I am hard pressed to understand how a new college lawnmower got 
put on the list as a higher priority than a faculty position, especially 
one that is so needed! I mean, with all that the strategic plan has to 
say about our environment changing and our student population 
changing  and you folks have clearly said that the strategic plan is 
your recipe for decision-making, you know  it seems ludicrous that 
a position that would help serve these students would get put behind 
all of this other stuff. I would just like to ask you where your 
priorities are. 
The vice-presidents listened and quietly reiterated the bottom-up process and 
philosophy. There was a flutter of whispering in one section of the room, and a 
hand shot up from a female chemistry instructor: 
I'd like to say one more thing about this new and wonderful process. 
I am a dedicated faculty member of this college who, in addition to 
teaching, also has to advise, keep up in my field, and be on a host of 
committees, along with a jillion other things. This process took a lot 
of time out of my schedule, time that I should.have been spending 
with students. We are a small department, and it took literally hours 
for us to come up with a list, which was sort of stupid anyway 
because there are so many things that are broken and that we need 
around this place. And then we had to do it all over again for the 
division. And I wasn't even very happy with the list that we ended up 
with. This is bureaucracy at its best, I think, and I think you better 
decide if you want this institution's faculty to be serving students in 
the classroom, or doing this kind of stuff. 
As much of the research in Chapter II suggested, organizational change 
occurs both via strategic intervention by leadership as well as outside of their 
control. It is clear through this chapter's descriptions that while organization leaders 
are trying to act, the organization is also a moving target. It is blown about by 71 
environmental winds, it grows and ages, and it is shaped by internal power 
struggles. This chapter describes case snapshots of organizational change at Seaview 
Community College using the theoretical construct of Kanter's three organizational 
forces of change and three forms of change viewed through the lens of specific 
events (Kanter et al., 1992). Chapter V will address the research questions as well 
as analyze and interpret the findings of the case study. 72 
CHAPTER V  
SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY 
This study attempted to analyze the organizational impact of significant 
changes in leadership at a specific public community college during the initial 
period of that change. The research findings, results, and conclusions of the study 
are described through the following discussion of the events discussed in Chapter IV 
tied with analyses related to the specific research questions described in Chapter I. 
To remain consistent with the rest of this study, the framework of Kanter's change 
theory is used as a backdrop for the analysis (Kanter et al., 1992). It is important to 
note that, just as organizational change does not occur with distinct starts and stops, 
the questions and answers related to this study are interwoven and linked together 
by their connection to the whole organizational change process, both in the 
literature and at Seaview. 
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ANALYSES 
Research Question #1 
What did the research literature reveal about the impacts of change, 
especially when new leadership is installed in an organization? 73 
Chapter II provided a comprehensive review of the literature related to 
organizational change and leadership roles within that change. Certainly for 
Seaview, one of the most significant concepts in the organizational change research 
literature is that of the mature organization that is faced with change. Kanter defines 
the last life cycle stage as maturity, which often presages decline because the 
organization fails to adapt to changing external conditions (Kanter et al., 1992). 
Organizational age involves accumulated experience: how much needs to be 
invented versus how much is given by tradition and therefore often done 
unthinkingly whether it fits the situation or not. Aging presents another inevitable 
dynamic: the addition of new people, primarily as replacements for those who 
leave. Newcomers are a potential source of enrichment via their new perspectives 
brought in from the outside. They also are, however, a potential threat to 
established activities because of their inexperience, their ignorance of traditions and 
routines, and their lack of relationships. 
Organizational age produces both internal and external handicaps related to 
the ability to change. One of the problems of age is the dilemma of success. The 
same accumulated habits, skills, technical systems, and values that helped an 
organization succeed in the past can turn into deeply embedded knowledge sets that 
inhibit innovation. The organization's belief in itself and in its distinctive 
competencies can become entrenched and unexamined. 
The jarring impact of the conflict at Seaview between its maturity gained 
from history of excellence rooted in academic tradition and the inevitable forces of 74 
the environment driving new changes produced two general questions for many on 
campus: how do we get there, and is it worth the trip? The aging of an organization 
as it proceeds through its life cycle clearly both causes change and also helps to 
stifle change. 
The results from the team building workshop reflected the common feeling 
that something had to change for the organization to continue to support its 
students. But it also indicated a hidden unease with all of the new changes, 
including the new people, which and who had not been a part of Seaview's rich 
history and enduring success. 
An institution's ethos integrates history, tradition, values, ecological 
context, and individual personalities into an invisible tapestry. In this tapestry, the 
affective dimensions of the organization such as loyalty and commitment can 
preserve and enhance the social ties across constituent groups by establishing 
common belief systems. 
The previous administration had supported a clan culture, in which shared 
values, goals, and the development of faculty and staff were emphasized. Their 
internal transactions were primarily guided by congruence of beliefs, trust, and 
tradition. The leader in a clan culture is generally considered to be a mentor, sage, 
or father figure, and that was also true at Seaview. While many on campus had 
described this culture as stifling and patronizing, the kaleidoscope exercise reflected 
current doubts about the new leadership team's ability to build trust within a new 
cultural norm of responsiveness and entrepreneurship. What were the new rules? 75 
And could the social ties be preserved as a new fabric of interactions, decisions, and 
relationships was woven? 
The new leadership team carefully analyzed the results of the survey as they 
began to plan their efforts, and recognized many fears about the implications of 
change imbedded in the results. In an effort to respond to the environment, would 
respected old programs (or people) be dumped to make room for new ones? Would 
changes happen randomly, or would there be a plan for them in which the campus 
would have a voice? Would the current administration honor the tradition of 
"family" of Seaview? Could they become a part of that family? 
There are constraints on top management's freedom to set strategic direction 
in the mature organization, and that interferes with the organization's ability to 
change. The constraints are often a result of fears that then turn into political 
struggles for power and control. 
Research Question #2 
What were the external and internal forces that influenced significant 
organizational change in this institution? 
In a relatively stable environment, established institutions can afford to look 
inward rather than outward, and to concentrate on protecting existing advantages 
rather than innovating. Change can be incremental, consisting of add-ons to the 
status quo by established players. 
Then the environment shifts. New technology challenges the dominant mode 
of production or distribution. The area of competition widens as players from other 76 
places migrate toward each other's resources. Political changes alter the landscape 
of known rules that the organization had previously mastered to become successful. 
Innovators from within the industry invade, with new approaches that win support. 
At this point, the environment both internally and externally is turbulent. 
The competition resulting from the new environment forces the organization to 
begin to rethink its contracts, assumptions, and way of doing things. The ways 
environmental forces shape the pressures and possibilities for change feel to those in 
the organization like a gale-force wind. 
The genuine desire to be part of the change process comes when individuals 
agree that change is necessary, beneficial, and not harmful to what they believe is 
their domain or interest. Organizational leaders play an important role in preparing 
their organization for change and for its institutionalization by influencing the 
perceptions and attitudes of the organization's members by defming and describing 
the environmental forces pushing on the organization. 
Forming relationships outside the institution with local leaders helped the 
new president to gain credibility in his initial efforts to describe the need for change 
to the institution. His decision to create the strategic planning team, charged with a 
first task of scanning the external environment, was an important one, along with 
his choice not to be an official part of the group. The team, comprised of 
representatives from key constituent groups, was able to independently assess the 
forces that were impacting Seaview, and because of their influence elsewhere in the 77 
institution, were able to communicate the importance of their findings in a way that 
was heard as legitimate by the rest of the organization. 
Hiring a former vice-president as a facilitator for the strategic planning 
group was a risky decision, given the continuing speeches the president was making 
related to Seaview's dire economic straits and the necessity for change to create a 
safe future for the institution. It could have been interpreted that Seaview really did 
have money for extra's, and therefore the president was simply crying wolf. But 
instead, the action communicated to the campus community the importance of the 
strategic planning effort, since contracted positions were rare at Seaview. Hiring a 
retired senior administrator of the former regime also ensured that the president 
would gain some help in understanding established cultural values and norms, as 
well as assured the campus of some continuity of a familiar face and style during a 
time in which an entire new senior leadership team was being recruited and hired. 
Finally, since the former vice-president was clearly an advocate for change and for 
the new leadership, it formed an emotional bridge for some who were tempted to 
equate "old" with "good." 
Though the forces of the environment were seen fairly clearly through this 
process, there was a conceptual gap in linking the institution's core values with the 
changes necessary to respond to the environmental demands. Though many at 
Seaview did recognize the strength of the environmental forces impacting them, 
they also were socially and psychologically comfortable with the established order 
at Seaview and were reluctant to accept the attendant changes that responding to the 78 
changing environment would bring. Though they had consciously hired a president 
who would help the institution, and therefore them, survive in a changing world, 
they were not expecting their own world to really change, and in fact, liked their 
institution's elite reputation and insular culture. Their history was part of their 
definition of success. 
As described in Chapter II, Beckhard and Pritchard (1992) define five forces 
that serve as the focus to fundamental change: change in the mission, change in the 
identity or outside image, change in relationships to key stakeholders, change in the 
way of work, and change in the culture. Although one focus of change may be the 
primary driver of the organizational change, the others will inevitably be affected as 
well. When the leadership at Seaview decided that the mission and purpose of the 
organization must evolve, subsequent decisions about changes in the way of work, 
outside image, and organizational design and structure also had to be considered. 
Research Question #3 
What was the impact on the organization of a shift from organizational 
stability to one of change? 
Political dynamics are forces for change, but they also produce inertia, 
especially for older organizations. The benefits come when political conflict allows 
more voices to be heard and innovation to appear. Despite those benefits, however, 
moving toward organizational change can be painful in previously stable 
organizations. 79 
As long as there is an assumption of shared values, conflicts can be about 
differences over tactics and not ultimate ends. Leaders need to ensure that the clash 
of ideas does not result in a formation of firm groupings unable to identify with a 
larger shared vision. 
The situation involving the lighting on campus at night for night classes 
seemed initially to be about logistics. The leadership team thought that they were 
doing simple problem-solving. They realized late that issues of politics and culture 
related to change were central to the problem. 
Institutional culture is difficult to modify intentionally. But leaders can be 
knowledgeable about the institution's history and translate stories and lessons so 
that they can fit the current organizational picture. The vision and actions of the 
leaders must be congruent with the history, traditions, and nuances that flow from 
the institution's own particular cultural context. 
Obviously the cultural and political values at Seaview related to governance, 
structures of decision-making, and historical traditions were stronger than the 
externally driven need for increasing enrollment through night classes. The 
leadership team was making decisions about lights. The rest of the campus saw 
political and cultural wins and losses. 
People think they have something to lose if they have something invested in 
the system in terms of status, beliefs, or values. Those who have a stake in that 
status quo are able to derail innovation, at least temporarily, by attacking the system 
at its weakest link: the bond that holds the group together. The group that blocked 80 
the contractor's truck coalesced by their common history at Seaview and shared 
value surrounding the trees. Though the lighting at night might also have been a 
concern to them, the political forces created a resistance to change that inhibited 
their ability to see the innovation as positive. 
At Seaview, all of Kanter's three forces of change (Kanter et al., 1992) were 
in motion simultaneously, and reinforced each other. The organization's position in 
its environment, combined with its life cycle stage, set the framework for politics 
and decisions that both impacted the leaders and helped the leaders to impact the 
organization. 
Looking at the sources of emergent change assists leaders to view the larger 
context in which they are trying to carry out their strategic intentions. Even while 
leaders are formulating goals and directions, forces in the environment are pushing 
in many directions, and life cycle and political dynamics within the organization are 
creating still other challenges. 
Research Question #4 
To what extent did the new senior leadership team influence or manage 
organizational change? 
The nature of the ties that organizations have with their key constituencies or 
stakeholders is vital. When aspects of relationships with those stakeholders are 
altered, either consciously or unconsciously, the organization changes. The degree 
to which the change can be managed depends on how much the leadership is aware 
of those stakeholder relationships. 81 
Many people and groups that are not direct parties to transactions that signal 
change may feel an emotional stake in them because they sense that their 
relationship with the organization may be altered. The focus of identity changes, as 
Kanter et al. (1992) describe them, is often on things that are tangible rather than on 
how the organization will operate after the change. These changes produce 
distractions in the organization and divert attention from the critical focus. 
The president and leadership team believed that the campus constituency did 
not have a strong investment in the design of the new logo and letterhead. That was 
probably true, at least literally speaking, although that was the focus of their 
reaction. In reality, the alteration of the institutional relationship with the 
stakeholders, implied through the actions of the president and leadership team, 
formed the fuel for the fury. The new logo did not matter as much as the perception 
of unilateral abandonment of the old letterhead and the values and relationships 
associated with it. 
One important lesson for leaders is that organizations can claim an identity 
change long before their constituents accept it. On a human level, it does not change 
all that quickly or easily. The president and leadership team saw the logo decision 
as being relatively unimportant and uneventful since there had been so much 
discussion about the need for change at Seaview in the previous months. The 
campus, however, saw the new executive team as forcibly making the campus into 
its own image  and that was clearly not going to happen easily, changing 
environment or not. 82 
Another important question was whether the organizational change at 
Seaview was allowed to be ad hoc rather than purposeful public policy. The 
president, while strongly suggesting that changes needed to occur in direction, did 
not formally articulate intended changes in mission or purpose. Is it possible that a 
30-year-old campus heard and interpreted his words as campaign promises, 
emotion-filled and well-intentioned but devoid of real meaning? In that context, the 
subsequent actions of the leadership team would certainly have seemed arbitrary and 
arrogant, and would have elicited predictable reactive responses. 
Research Question #5 
How was organizational change implemented by a new senior leadership 
team in one community college? 
Leaders in organizations at the mature end of the life cycle often attempt to 
dismantle the complex and slow-moving mechanisms that have developed over time 
and are now not responsive to the new environmental pressures or to the new 
identity of an organization endeavoring to respond to those pressures. 
In some cases, coordination changes occur informally without reorganizing 
the whole institution. Relationships, communication, and the flexibility to combine 
resources are more important than formal channels and reporting relationships. In 
other instances, substantive changes in the structure and processes drive the 
organizational change. 
As fledgling institutions with a desire for quality and standards of 
excellence, community colleges invented rules and procedures as they were needed. 83 
Over time a hierarchy and rules proliferated, giving community colleges many of 
the characteristics of a complex bureaucracy. The president and leadership team at 
Seaview viewed the budget process as a large-scale way to effect change at the 
college. Building a budget from the department level up would give employees at 
the lowest levels inclusive opportunities to have a voice in the organization's 
decisions. It would encourage objective assessments of programs and data driven by 
the external environment and community needs. It would eliminate arbitrary and 
confusing processes and procedures, building trust and confidence. It would be tied 
to the Strategic Plan, making budget allocations consistent with the new major 
thrusts and directions of the institution. To drive transformational change, the team 
was endeavoring to alter the parts of the organization in relation to the whole in a 
way that would be congruent with the institution's belief systems. 
Leaders who are guiding an institution through the process of change can 
piece together many of the parts of their organization's beliefs to serve as a magnet 
for the building blocks of institutionalizing change. Figuring out what those beliefs 
are, however, can be likened to the story of the blind men attempting to describe an 
elephant. It involves constructing an organization's history, observing current 
perceptions of structure and function, and understanding the coordination of the 
separate pieces in relation to the whole. And it is an especially challenging task for 
new leaders. Interest groups, managers, and leaders of change are likely to describe 
the elephant all differently, depending on what part they were looking at. 84 
The initial enthusiasm for the new process was misleading. Many people at 
the program level believed that having a voice in the budget process meant that their 
own budget priorities would be fulfilled, hence the staff member in Financial Aid's 
comment about finally being able to get new furniture for their department. When it 
became clear that that was not the case, some of them felt betrayed. 
The process itself moved without a hitch from the department to the division 
level throughout the college. However, the leadership team had not expected the 
level of emotional upheaval that the process engendered. The departments and 
divisions had, in the past, formed tight collegial bonds through mutual griping about 
their department's budget allocation determined unilaterally by the president  a 
sort of "us against them" force. Without that process to bind them together, 
individual idiosyncrasies suddenly led to petty conflicts and divisiveness that was 
disturbing to them. 
Resistance to change arises when leadership challenges the comfort of a 
group who then resents having the ideology with which they are comfortable called 
into question, and they resent even more being forced to question that ideology 
themselves. Because the proposed change disturbs the carefully constructed world in 
which they have learned to live and have power, the group strikes back with moral 
rectitude of established practices and values. Even though the leaders may argue 
that the change will not affect the power, prestige, or positions of the group, the 
people impacted understand intuitively that change does, in fact, undermine their 
ideology, upset their belief system, and cause them general discomfort. 85 
Research Question #6 
What can be learned from this case study about the impact on a large and 
stable community college resulting from a significant change in executive 
leadership? 
When stakeholders or interest groups become dissatisfied with organizational 
performance, or when their roles or power change, struggles for control can ensue. 
Stakeholders seek control changes when they think management strategies will not 
be beneficial to their interests. But control changes can also bring management 
changes permitting new ways of thinking. A new leadership team or CEO can find 
it easier to define and implement a new strategy on a honeymoon that would not be 
tolerated from a more established manager. However, a control shift can only 
permit or enable reorganizing or revitalizing. It does not automatically entail the 
right moves. 
Colleges are professional organizations "where [individuals] can act as if 
[they] are self-employed yet regularly receive a paycheck. [They are seemingly] 
upside-down organizations, where the workers sometimes appear to manage their 
bosses" (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 173). Leaders in such organizations do not control, 
instead, they mobilize resources within a network of complex relationships. 
Bringing about change requires leaders to understand those relationships and 
be able to discern the interests individuals and groups have in supporting or 
resisting change. To a large extent, the coordination structures of higher education 
institutions influence those interests. 86 
The division director in the science division at Seaview had learned over 
time to win via a political strategy based on the old rules. He knew well how to 
manipulate the game so that his division would emerge victorious, and in fact, felt 
obligated to protect his division against what he perceived to be predators. The new 
budget process negated his hard-won skills, which became clear to him when his 
strategy to get the new math lab faculty member failed. He was humiliated and 
furious. 
He quickly figured out, however, how he might be able to change the 
structure back to the one in which he could be successful. By making the budget 
process difficult and time-consuming for the faculty in his division, as well as by 
placing a few well-timed comments to key faculty, he could suggest implicitly that 
the new process was not central to the teaching and learning mission of the college. 
The value of teaching and learning was such a central core to Seaview's tradition of 
excellence that had reverberated throughout its long history, faculty in the division 
were instantly galvanized. 
In an ideal organization, people understand the necessity for change and 
support it accordingly. In real organizations, commitment to change only follows 
discussion that helps create the setting for change by facilitating reconciliation of 
differences. The exchange of ideas, often accompanied by both enthusiasm and 
acrimony, makes it more difficult for the organization to return to business as usual. 
This part of the change process is uncomfortable for all involved, but it is the 
catharsis that takes place during the debates that permits movement forward. 87 
The science division meeting was not the last conversation that faculty had 
with the leadership team about the new budget process, and indeed, those 
discussions continued even after this study as the process was fine-tuned and 
political factions regrouped. But the old way did not prevail, and organizational 
change at Seaview continues to evolve. 
Changes in identity, coordination, or control of an organization are often 
associated with dramatic upheaval. Leaders need to both prevent crises from 
spinning out of control and also to keep the everyday activities going that keep the 
organization moving toward the intended change. It is often difficult to avoid just 
managing the changes others are creating rather than continuing to proactively steer 
change in desirable directions. 
It is clear that leaders cannot mandate change, nor are they exempt from its 
effects. Many stakeholders, relationships, history, and systems impact 
organizational change. The challenge of change is not simply a large-scale 
conceptual and philosophical issue. It is also a practical issue of choosing actions 
and making decisions. Change only looks revolutionary in retrospect. There is no 
break between time before change and after change. Major changes in large 
organizations are more likely to represent the accumulation of small concrete 
actions built up slowly over time, step-by-step. Seaview Community College was no 
exception. 88 
WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THIS STUDY 
Some conclusions may be drawn from this study, although as with all 
qualitative research, results are not generalizable and are only applicable within the 
context of the research. 
Because the CEO and the leadership team changed in a short time period at 
Seaview, the altered team demographics allowed the senior team to take substantive 
action in a turbulent environment. According to the research described in this study, 
frame-breaking change requires direct executive involvement in all aspects of 
change. In reality, it was often difficult for the team at Seaview to determine at 
what level and to what degree their direct intervention was needed, especially when 
decisions and events overlapped with one another in the complexity of 
organizational life. The old analogy of trying to change a tire while their vehicle 
was moving is an apt description for the frustrations of the team. 
Also, system-wide organizational change may have been too often viewed by 
the leadership team as occurring through formal processes and procedures, rather 
than through cultural and political influences. The research in this study suggested 
that homogeneity in terms of length of service in a top leadership team is associated 
with positive organizational outcomes during times of change, and the Seaview team 
did, in fact, move cohesively and without conflict in decision-making. However, the 
homogeneity, and the resulting collegiality, also occasionally contributed to a kind 
of "group think," in which the president's natural tendency to solve problems 
through formal channels and avoid dealing with affective concerns, was not 89 
counteracted or balanced by his leadership team. They thus missed, on several 
occasions, the subtler hints of political and cultural resistance that ultimately 
impacted their intended formal changes. 
This study also pointed to the importance of mid-level managers in change 
efforts, and that lack of support and commitment from them has an extremely 
negative impact on the success of large-scale change efforts. The president and the 
top leadership team could have involved this group at Seaview to a greater degree, 
especially in efforts that would have resulted in a greater philosophical 
understanding of the importance of the change of direction at Seaview. People think 
they have something to lose if they have something invested in the system of status, 
beliefs, or values. The long-time mid-level managers at Seaview were strongly tied 
to their historical successes at Seaview, and increased efforts to help them gain 
competencies in the new skills required to succeed at the new Seaview might have 
eliminated some of the confusion created in the redesigned budget process. 
The first year of the new leadership team was significant in its opportunity 
for change, but it also created pressure to do things quickly. Some of the changes of 
the team were probably implemented too soon, before they could translate the 
organization's stories and history so that they fit the current organizational picture. 
On the other hand, the new paradigm of change was quickly communicated to the 
campus constituency through the team's actions, although whether it was negatively 
or positively perceived varied. Could the president have helped by more consciously 
articulating the mission change at Seaview? The organizational changes that 90 
occurred without formal college statements of policy could have been viewed by the 
campus as reactive as opposed to conscious, proactive choices, thereby creating 
more resistance. 
CONCLUSION 
Samuel Johnson, the eighteenth century scholar, took his colleague James 
Boswell to a performance of a celebrated dog that walked on its hind legs. Boswell 
was disappointed and pointed out that the dog didn't walk very well and didn't 
always respond appropriately to its master's instructions. Johnson answered, "It's 
not how well the thing is done. It's that the thing is done at all." 
Seaview Community College provided an interesting glimpse into 
organizational change at its most dramatic: a traditional 30-year-old institution 
steaming toward the twenty-first century with new leadership who sometimes 
guided the huge vessel in making large, slow turns in a new direction, but who also 
sometimes just held on tight while the vessel lurched and swayed in the 
unpredictable seas of change. 
The case study format for the research provided a rich opportunity for 
gathering data on organizational change in the community college setting. 
Compiling thick descriptive information was made easier by being a participant-
observer; there would have been much subtle information that would not have been 
included if access to meetings, conversations, and documents, both formal and 
informal, had been more limited. On the other hand, as a participant observer, it 91 
was also sometimes difficult to know when enough information had been gathered. 
A case study is simply a snapshot that can provide opportunity for qualitative 
examination, but as a participant as well as an observer, it was tempting to continue 
the descriptive investigation of some complex situations past the point in which 
clarity of analysis could be achieved. 
Also, while being a participant observer was particularly valuable in this 
case study because it provided opportunities to see organizational change from the 
inside-out, it also was an unusual situation that could not be duplicated in another 
time period. Being one of the new senior leadership team members during the year 
of the research, allowed the researcher for this short time to be somewhat objective 
in observations, as people on campus had no history or experiences with me that 
limited their interactions as data were gathered. After another year or two at this 
institution, even were the researcher to intend otherwise, the researcher will also 
become a part of Seaview's past and current history, and will no longer be able to 
see with a clear perspective. This opportunity for participant-observer research was 
unique; the research would not have been effective at another institution or in 
another time period. 
As with all qualitative research, this study cannot be generalized to other 
situations. The fmdings in the study provide support for prior research about 
organizational culture and suggest areas in which further exploration is necessary. 
The case of Seaview Community College provides some insight into organizational 
change. There, a new senior leadership team was beginning to work together to 92 
change very long historical patterns within a traditional institution. But does change 
of this magnitude occur in institutions of higher education with less history and 
fewer entrenched traditions? To what degree do the external environmental 
pressures influence or limit routine and daily decisions? Can necessary 
organizational change occur without the complete replacement of the president and 
senior leadership team? Additional research is necessary to place the ramifications 
of this study's findings in a larger context. 
Organizational change in community colleges will continue to occur, both 
driven by the forces blowing it toward the twenty-first century, and by the 
leadership encouraging and nurturing new ways of thinking in academic institutions. 
Further research in organizational change at community colleges specifically is 
necessary to continue to explore how leaders can most effectively use the forces and 
forms of change to most positively impact their institutions, their communities, and 
their students. 93 
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APPENDIX  102 
CURRENT AND ARCHIVED RECORDS AND HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 
REVIEWED FOR THIS CASE STUDY RESEARCH INCLUDED THE 
FOLLOWING: 
VISTA (internal college newsletter) produced 1967-1997. 
Student newspaper (various names) 1967-1997. 
Minutes from College Cabinet 1985-1997. 
President's correspondence 1978-1997. 
AFT newsletter (produced by faculty union) 1970-1997. 
Accreditation and self-study reports 1967-1997. 
Board Reports 1985-1997. 
Specific memos, letters, and reports relevant to the study. 
FORMAL INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED WITH: 
Faculty member, mathematics, 30 years at institution. 
Faculty member, business, 27 years at institution. 
Faculty member, liberal arts, 5 years at institution. 
Classified staff member, office assistant, 25 years at institution. 
Classified staff member, plant operations, 12 years at institution. 
Program coordinator, student services, 16 years at institution. 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
Members of a Board of Trustees, which officially governs each local community 
college, are appointed by the Governor in the State of Washington, where this 
research was completed. During the time of the research between November 1996 
and July 1997, the Board of Trustees at the institution studied was very new. Prior 
to the new President's hire and in the subsequent year after his hire, all positions 
changed on the Board for various reasons. This is unusual, and it also meant that 
the Board did not play as much of a role in guidance or decisions as they might 
otherwise, and for this reason, their input was not considered a relevant part of the 
research in the study. 